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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the debate on optimal policy, using New Keynesian dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that contain a variety of monetary,
scal and credit policy tools.
First, we examine optimal monetary policy in an open economy, utilizing Gali and
Monacellis (2005) DSGE model. We nd that the utility based loss function in the
open economy depends on the variance of the terms of trade, in addition to the variance
of consumption and ination. As a result, optimal policy in the open economy is not
isomorphic to the one in the closed economy and does not require strict domestic ina-
tion targeting. In the open economy, interest rate rules which react to the movements
in ination and the terms of trade are preferred to the domestic ination based Taylor
rule.
Second, we examine the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential tools and their interaction
with monetary policy. Using a Gertler and Karadi (2011) type DSGE model with
nancial frictions, we present a formal comparative analysis of three macroprudential
instruments: (i) reserve requirements, (ii) capital requirements and (iii) a regulation
premium. We nd that capital requirements are the most e¤ective macroprudential
tool in mitigating the negative e¤ects of the nancial accelerator mechanism built in
banksborrowing constraints. Irrespective of the type of shock a¤ecting the economy,
use of capital requirements generates the highest welfare gains.
Finally, we analyze unconventional monetary and scal policy measures that can be
used to counteract the unfavorable consequences of a nancial crisis. Adding distor-
tionary taxation to Gertler and Karadis (2011) framework, we provide a comprehensive
assessment of credit easing and bank capital injections. We nd that the use of both
policies mitigates the negative e¤ects of nancial shocks to the economy. Credit easing
results in a lower stabilizing e¤ect on aggregate output and a decrease in tax rates.
Bank capital injections, on the other hand, lead to a rise in government expenditures
and hence, taxes. As the relative importance of distortions in nancial markets is
higher than the distortions caused by variable tax rates, use of bank capital injections
generates the highest welfare gains, under both distortionary and lump-sum taxation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, the use of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models in
optimal policy analysis has increased signicantly. These models make use of microfoun-
dations to explain the behaviour of the aggregate economy. Hence, they are not subject
to the LucasCritique (1976). In addition, as the microfoundations in DSGE models
are based on economic agentspreferences, DSGE models serve as suitable frameworks
for evaluating the welfare e¤ects of alternative policies (Woodford, 2003).
One of the main areas of macroeconomic research, where DSGE models have been
extensively used, is the determination of optimal monetary policy. Before the global -
nancial crisis, exploring the di¤erences between optimal monetary policies in closed and
open economies has been a central area of interest in policy analysis. Prominent exam-
ples of models developed for this purpose include Gali and Monacelli (2005), Sutherland
(2005) and De Paoli (2009). Examining the various studies in the literature, it can be
seen that domestic ination targeting is the broadly accepted optimal monetary policy
in the closed economy. However, there has been no clear agreement on the optimal
policy in open economies.
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The 2007-09 crisis has clearly shown that a disruption in the nancial sector can lead
to a sharp downturn in the economy. In the rst quarter of 2009, the real U.S. GDP
and the world GDP contracted by an annual rate of 6.4% and 7.3%, respectively. By
the fourth quarter of 2009, the unemployment rate in the U.S. topped 10% (Mishkin,
2010). Hence, following the recent crisis, the literature on macroeconomic models and
policies has been reshaped considerably. Macroeconomists agreed upon the necessity
to incorporate nancial frictions into macroeconomic models and to examine the sig-
nicance of nancial shocks. As a result, the variety of DSGE models used in policy
analysis expanded. Two relevant strands of the literature, based on frameworks that
introduce nancial intermediation into DSGE models, have emerged. The rst includes
nancial frictions associated with the constraints of non-nancial borrowers, making
use of the nancial accelerator mechanism designed by Bernanke et al (1999). The
second set of studies contain nancial frictions linked to nancial intermediaries. The
framework developed by Gertler and Karadi (2011) is one of the leading examples.
The recent nancial crisis has also highlighted the need to expand the research on
optimal policy. As a result, the new stream of DSGE models have been commonly
used in the analysis of alternative policy tools. First, it became evident that price
stability, to be obtained with the use of the interest rate, is not su¢ cient to guarantee
the stability of the nancial system. As the "Tinbergen principle" states, the number
of independent instruments should at least be equal to the number of policy objectives.
Consequently, to reduce systemic risks and ensure the stability of the nancial system,
the monetary policy instrument should be supported by additional tools, which are
referred to as macroprudential policy instruments (Bank for International Settlements,
2010). Counter-cyclical capital requirements introduced by the Basel III reform package
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is one of the prominent examples of macroprudential tools. A large number of countries,
including the U.S. and the EU, have completed the adoption of this instrument in the
past few years1. Other well-known examples of macroprudential policy tools include
counter-cyclical loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and reserve requirements. As the analysis in
Claessens (2014) demonstrates, LTV ratio is the most commonly used macroprudential
tool in advanced and emerging economies and reserve requirements are highly used in
emerging markets. Following the crisis, the e¤ectiveness of these three macroprudential
tools and their interaction with monetary policy have been examined in various studies.
Galati and Moessner (2014) provide a comprehensive review of the recent progress in
theoretical research on the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential policies.
In terms of policy, the global nancial crisis has also shown that conventional policies
need to be supplemented with unconventional policy measures in times of nancial
crises. During the 2007-09 episode, the Fed, the Bank of England (BoE) and the
Bank of Japan have established several lending and asset purchase programmes to
provide liquidity to nancial markets. The BoE operated the Asset Purchase Facility
(APF) and purchased 3 billion pounds of private assets. The Bank of Japan has also
announced purchases of 3 trillion yens in commercial paper (Fawley and Neely, 2013).
In addition, the U.S. Treasury has used the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) to inject
205 billion dollars of equity into nancial institutions. The U.K. Treasury has also
injected 50 billion pounds of equity into British banks (Mishkin, 2010). In line with
these developments, the use of unconventional policy measures has also been explored in
numerous DSGE models. The papers by Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Gertler and
Karadi (2011) are among the rst that attempt to examine the e¤ects of unconventional
policies, such as credit and quantitative easing.
1Progress Report on the Implementation of the Basel Regulatory Framework (as of October 2014).
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This thesis aims to present a comprehensive analysis of diverse policy instruments,
using a variety of New Keynesian DSGE models. In Chapter 2, we analyze whether
there are any di¤erences between the optimal monetary policy in the open and the
closed economy. To do so, we generalize the special setting used in Gali and Monacellis
(2005) small open economy framework, where the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion,
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and the elasticity of
substitution between foreign goods from di¤erent origins are set equal to 1. Moreover,
we examine the implications of using a wider set of simple policy rules in the open
economy. These include a domestic ination based Taylor rule (DITR), a CPI ination
based Taylor rule (CITR), an exchange rate peg (PEG), and two domestic ination and
terms of trade based Taylor rules (DITTR and DITTR(-1)).
Under the special case used by Gali and Monacelli (2005), it is possible to determine
the size of the subsidy which will exactly o¤set the mixed e¤ects of the distortions
caused by the market power of rms and the central banks incentive to inuence
the terms of trade. Hence, as in the closed economy, the exible price equilibrium
allocation is optimal and requires domestic prices to be stabilized under the optimal
policy. However, under the general case in the open economy, we show that it is not
possible to determine the size of this subsidy. As a result, the existence of the distortions
pushes optimal policy away from domestic ination targeting. In addition, we nd that
the utility based welfare loss function under the general case is quite di¤erent from the
one obtained under the special case. Under the general setting, welfare losses in the
open economy depend on the variance of the terms of trade, consumption and ination.
As a result, monetary policy for the open economy is not isomorphic to the one for the
closed economy.
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We then analyze the equilibrium properties of various macroeconomic variables un-
der di¤erent policy rules. We nd that when the general case is used, the volatility of
domestic ination achieved under the PEG is lower than the volatility obtained under
the DITR. However, under the special case, the opposite is observed. With the spe-
cial case, the shock to world output has an e¤ect on domestic ination under the PEG,
while this e¤ect is not present under the DITR. On the contrary, under the general case,
domestic ination is a¤ected by both shocks under both policy rules. As a result, with
the general case, the variance of domestic ination increases due to the shock to world
output under the DITR. On the other hand, the lower variance in the terms of trade
results in a lower variance in ination under the PEG, as the exchange rate remains
unchanged. Hence, in contrast to the special case, the volatility of ination obtained
under the PEG is lower than the volatility obtained under the DITR. Moreover, among
the aforementioned policy rules, the lowest volatility of ination is achieved under the
DITTR(-1).
Finally, we compute the welfare losses achieved under each policy rule. We nd
that the welfare losses obtained under di¤erent policy rules depend on the source of the
exogenous shock a¤ecting the small open economy. When both domestic and foreign
shocks are present, welfare levels associated with DITTR and DITTR(-1) are higher
than the level associated with the DITR. In addition, the lowest welfare loss is obtained
under the DITTR(-1). As a result, in the small open economy, interest rate rules that
react to the movements in the terms of trade and domestic ination are preferred to
the domestic ination based Taylor rule.
Next, in the third chapter, we compare the e¤ectiveness of alternative macropru-
dential policies and determine if there is a leading macroprudential tool for targeting a
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specic market externality. In our analysis, we utilize a New Keynesian DSGE model
containing nancial frictions as described in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The tools that
we include in our study are (i) reserve requirements, (ii) capital requirements and (iii) a
regulation premium, whose formulation is based on the assumption that macropruden-
tial policies in general increase the costs of nancial intermediaries, who in turn pass
these costs onto borrowers (Unsal, 2013). In our framework, the nancial accelerator
mechanism built in banksborrowing constraints involves a pecuniary externality, where
bankers do not consider the fact that if they issued more equity, they would decrease
the risk of the banking sector. As a result, the banking sectors ine¢ ciently high level
of leverage amplies the negative e¤ects of exogenous shocks to the economy and urges
the need for macroprudential regulation (Gertler et al, 2012). Reserve requirements and
capital requirements increase the cost of deposits to banks, inducing them to replace
deposit nancing by equity nancing. A rise in the regulation premium is reected in
the increase in cost of borrowing to rms. To ensure comparability, all macropruden-
tial instruments in our study respond to the same nancial variable, which is the total
nominal credit growth in the economy, with the same intensity.
When the economy is hit by a productivity or a nancial shock, the use of all the
aforementioned macroprudential tools mitigates the negative e¤ects of the given shocks
to the economy. These shocks bring about a decline in asset prices, which triggers the
nancial accelerator mechanism. As banks are leveraged, the decline in asset prices
results in an amplied decrease in their net worth, which causes a downturn in their
balance sheets and hence, an increases in their leverage ratios. The increase in the
leverage ratio increases the spread, and in turn, results in a rise in the cost of capital,
which causes a further decline in investment and asset prices. Finally, the decrease
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in investment leads to a decline in aggregate output. When counter-cyclical reserve
requirements or capital requirements are used in combination with monetary policy,
the decline in banksnet worth, and hence the increase in the leverage ratios and the
spread is smaller. Consequently, the decrease in assets prices, investment and output
are lower. Counter-cyclical use of the regulation premium directly lowers the increase
in the cost of capital. As a result, the decrease in aggregate output is again lowered.
Comparing the dynamics of both shocks under alternative macroprudential policies,
it can be seen that capital requirements are the most e¤ective macroprudential tool
in lowering the negative e¤ects of the given shocks to the spread, asset prices and
investment. As a result, they mitigate the negative e¤ects of the nancial accelerator
mechanism built in banksbalance sheet constraints the most.
We also use welfare-maximizing monetary and macroprudential policy rules to cal-
culate the welfare losses obtained under each policy alternative. Using the case where
the economy is a¤ected by a productivity or a nancial shock only, we see that the
use of each macroprudential policy results in a decrease in the welfare loss, under both
shocks. The macroprudential policy tool that generates the lowest welfare gains is the
regulation premium under the productivity shock, while it is the reserve requirements
under the nancial shock. The use of capital requirements generates the highest welfare
gains, irrespective of the type of the shock a¤ecting the economy.
Finally, in Chapter 4, we present a comprehensive assessment of two types of uncon-
ventional policies and compare their scal implications. The policy measures that we
include in our study are credit easing by the central bank and bank capital injections
by the government. When the rst policy is used, the central bank increases the total
credit in the economy with the supply of loans to non-nancial rms. The use of the
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second policy directly increases the capital of banks. We assume that the central bank
or the government face e¢ ciency costs when one of the given policies is pursued.
We compare both the costs and the benets of using these policy measures, utilizing
the framework that we develop in the third chapter. As the returns and the costs
from the use of unconventional policies are both reected in the governments budget
constraint, scal policy tools need to adjust to the changes in the scal balance, that are
induced by the use of these policies. To examine the consequences of using alternative
scal instruments, we add two separate distortionary taxes, which are consumption and
labour income taxes, to our framework. Hence, we can examine the scal implications of
alternative unconventional policy measures, under three scenarios: (i) the government
adopts lump-sum taxes and uses government spending to respond to the changes in its
budget, (ii) the government adopts distortionary (consumption or labour income) taxes
and uses the tax rate to adjust to the changes in the governments budget constraint
and (iii) the government adopts distortionary taxes and uses government spending to
accommodate the changes in the scal balance.
When the economy is a¤ected by a nancial shock, the use of both types of uncon-
ventional policy measures mitigates its negative e¤ects. As explained in the previous
chapter, the nancial shock results in a decrease in asset prices, which triggers the -
nancial accelerator mechanism. This decrease corresponds to an increase in the leverage
ratio, the credit spread and the cost of capital. As a result, asset prices, investment
and aggregate output decrease. When the monetary authority uses credit easing or the
government injects equity into banks, the rise in the credit spread is dampened. Hence,
the increase in the cost of capital, and the decrease in investment and aggregate output
are lower. As bank capital injections induce a straightforward increase in banksnet
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worth, they result in a signicantly lower increase in the leverage ratio and the spread,
compared to credit easing. Hence, their positive e¤ect on investment and aggregate
output is higher. Since the return to government equity is the same as the return
to government bonds, there are no excess returns to government equity, under bank
capital injections. In contrast, when credit easing is used, the central bank can utilize
the excess return on assets present in times of the nancial crisis. Consequently, the
presence of the e¢ ciency costs of unconventional policies results in an increase in scal
costs, with the use of bank capital injections. However, utilization of credit easing re-
sults in an increase in scal revenues, as the excess return to government intermediated
assets is higher than the e¢ ciency costs. As a result, under scenarios (i) and (iii), bank
capital injections result in a decrease in government sending, while the use of credit
easing increases the same variable. Under scenario (ii), there is a decrease (increase) in
the tax rates when credit easing (bank capital injections) is used. Under all scenarios,
use of bank capital injections still induces the lowest decline in economic activity.
We also compare the welfare implications of credit easing and bank capital injec-
tions under scenarios (i), (ii) and (iii). We again utilize welfare-maximizing monetary
and unconventional policy rules in our welfare analysis. Our results indicate that when
lump-sum taxes instead of distortionary taxes are in place, use of credit policies gen-
erates higher welfare gains, only when the government uses the tax rates to respond
to the changes in its budget. However, when government spending is used to accom-
modate these changes, the existence of distortionary taxes does not cause a decline in
welfare. The use of unconventional policies still generates welfare gains, when variable
tax rates are in place. Moreover, utilization of bank capital injections results in the
highest welfare gains, under all three scenarios.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Monetary Policy for the
Small Open Economy Revisited
2.1 Introduction
The question of how to conduct monetary policy has always been an area of interest
in macroeconomic research. When economists rst started focusing on non-monetary
factors in the real business cycle, the importance of monetary policy was undermined
for a period. However, in the late 1980s, there has been a rebirth of interest in this area,
as a stream of empirical work has highlighted the non-neutrality of money. During this
period, economists have also started evaluating monetary policy rules using dynamic
general equilibrium theory. This development has supported the resurgence of interest
in the area. Both closed and open economy versions of the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models have featured in policy analyses. In contrast to the studies
that examine the closed economy and suggest domestic ination targeting as the opti-
mal policy, no clear agreement on optimal monetary policy for the open economy has
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emerged.
In this paper, utilizing Gali and Monacelli (GM)s (2005) small open economy frame-
work with monopolistic competition and sticky prices, we revisit the question of "which
monetary policy should central banks implement in an open economy". In their study,
using a special case where the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (), the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods (), and the elasticity of substitution
between foreign goods from di¤erent origins () are equal to 1, the authors nd that
the optimal monetary policy for a small open economy is isomorphic to the one for a
closed economy.
However, di¤erent studies which examine the optimal monetary policy in an open
economy setting emphasize that a country might benet from inuencing its terms of
trade. To start with, Ball (1999) nds that ination targeting can be suboptimal in
open economies. The optimal policy rule in an open economy has some di¤erences from
the Taylor rule of the closed economy. First, the policy instrument of the central bank is
not just the interest rate but it is a weighted sum of the interest rate and the exchange
rate. Second, in the policy rule, this index responds to long-runination, which is a
measure of ination altered according to the temporary e¤ects of exchange rate move-
ments. According to Svensson (2000), including the movements in the exchange rate in
monetary policy analysis has several important consequences. First, the exchange rate
adds channels to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Second, the exchange
rate is a forward-looking variable determined by expectations. This helps in making
forward-looking behaviour and the role of expectations vital in the analysis of monetary
policy. Third, some disturbances in the rest of the world, such as the uctuations in
foreign ination and foreign interest rates are transmitted through the exchange rate.
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With strict ination targeting, policymakers are expected to have a considerable ac-
tivism in monetary policy, which may result in substantial volatility of macrovariables
other than ination. On the contrary, exible CPI ination targeting stabilizes CPI
ination and also results in the stabilization of real exchange rates and other variables.
Using a general equilibrium model among interdependent countries, Corsetti and Pe-
senti (2001) also nd that policies just concentrating on stabilizing domestic prices and
the output gap might cause the economy to end up with ine¢ ciently high prices of im-
ports, and hence with suboptimal welfare levels. In open economies, policymakers can
increase welfare by sacricing output gap stability for lower consumer prices. Finally,
Sutherland (2005) and De Paoli (2009) support these ndings in a two-country DSGE
model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices. Using an analytical derivation
of the representative households welfare, they nd that for high values of the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, an exchange rate peg results in a
higher welfare level than the one achieved with ination targeting.
Inspired by these studies, the purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we generalize
the setting used by GM (2005), without restricting ,  and  to 1 and examine whether
the optimal policy for the open economy is still isomorphic to the one for the closed
economy. In addition, we study the implications of a wider set of simple policy rules in
the open economy. More specically, a domestic ination based Taylor rule (DITR), a
CPI ination based Taylor rule (CITR), an exchange rate peg (PEG), and two domestic
ination and terms of trade based Taylor rules (DITTR and DITTR(-1)), that have not
been previously considered in the aforementioned studies, are used in our comparison.
We start our analysis with the derivation of the optimal allocation in the open econ-
omy. Under the special case, it is possible to determine the subsidy, which will exactly
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o¤set the mixed e¤ects of the distortions caused by the market power of rms and the
central banks incentive to inuence the terms of trade. This, in turn, guarantees the
optimality of the exible price equilibrium allocation and requires domestic prices to
be stabilized under the optimal policy, as in the closed economy. However, under the
general case in the open economy, it is not possible to determine this subsidy. Hence,
the presence of a monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality drives optimal
policy away from domestic ination targeting. To have a precise qualitative analysis
of monetary policy in the small open economy, we also derive the utility based welfare
loss function under the general case. We nd that welfare losses in the open economy
depend on the variance of the terms of trade, in addition to the variance of consumption
and ination. As a result, the monetary policy for the open economy is not isomorphic
to the one for the closed economy.
We continue our analysis with the examination of the impulse responses to a domes-
tic and a foreign shock. Moreover, we analyze the volatilities of di¤erent macroeconomic
variables obtained under each simple policy rule, when the economy experiences both
shocks. Our results show that with the general setting, the volatility of domestic ina-
tion achieved under the PEG is lower than the one achieved under the DITR, while the
opposite is observed with the special case. When the special parametrization is used,
the shock to world output has an e¤ect on domestic ination under the PEG, while
this e¤ect is not present under the DITR. On the contrary, under the general case,
domestic ination is a¤ected by both shocks under both policy rules. As a result, when
the general case is used, the variance of domestic ination rises because of the shock
to world output under the DITR. On the other hand, the lower variance in the terms
of trade results in a lower variance in ination under the PEG, since the exchange rate
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does not uctuate. In addition, the lowest volatility of ination is achieved under the
DITTR(-1).
We conclude our analysis with the computation of the welfare losses achieved under
each simple policy rule. We nd that the welfare levels obtained under di¤erent mon-
etary policy rules depend on the exogenous shock a¤ecting the small open economy.
Under the presence of productivity and world output shocks, welfare levels associated
with domestic ination and terms of trade based Taylor rules are higher than the level
associated with the DITR. Moreover, the lowest welfare loss is obtained under the
DITTR(-1). Hence, in the small open economy, interest rate rules that react to the
movements in the terms of trade and domestic ination are preferred to the DITR.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the small open economy model
and its dynamics. Section 2.3 shows the optimal allocation in the open economy and
derives the welfare loss function used in comparing di¤erent monetary policy rules. Sec-
tion 2.4 explains the values of the parameters used in the updated calibration. Section
2.5 analyzes the dynamic e¤ects of two di¤erent shocks on various macroeconomic vari-
ables, under di¤erent monetary policy rules. Section 2.6 presents the volatilities and
the welfare losses obtained under each policy rule. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The model used in our analysis is an open economy general equilibrium model, with
imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. The world economy in the model consists
of innitesimally small open economies. Hence, the decisions of the each small economy
regarding its domestic policy do not a¤ect the rest of the world.
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2.2.1 Households
The analysis of our model starts with the examination of the representative house-
holds utility maximization in the small open economy. Accordingly, the representative
household maximizes expected discounted utility
E0
1P
t=0
tU(Ct; Nt) (2.1)
The utility function is assumed to be separable in consumption and labour and the
period utility is assumed to have the following form1,
U(C;N) =
C1 
1    
N1+'
1 + '
Here, Nt denes hours worked, and Ct denotes a composite consumption index given
by
Ct = [(1  )1=(CH;t)
 1
 + 1=(CF;t)
 1
 ]

 1 (2.2)
The consumption index gives the consumption preferences of the household among
domestic and imported bundles of goods, CH;t and CF;t, respectively. Each bundle
consists of imperfectly substitutable varieties, with an elasticity of substitution given
by  and . Hence, the bundles are given by
CH;t= (
Z 1
0
CH;t(j)
 1
 dj)

 1 CF;t= (
Z 1
0
Ci;t
 1
 di)

 1
1For  = 1, utility of consumption is denoted by log-utility.
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where j 2 [0; 1] refers to the variety of goods and Ci;t refers to the index of the
quantity of goods imported from country i by domestic consumers. It has the same
functional form as CH;t. Following these denitions, it should be noticed that  gives the
elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the same country, while  shows
the elasticity of substitution between foreign goods produced in di¤erent countries.
Other parameters that are important in the analysis of the households behaviour
are:  2 [0; 1] which gives the degree of openness and  that gives the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
The household maximizes utility subject to her budget constraint,
Z 1
0
PH;t(j)CH;t(j)dj+
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Pi;t(j)Ci;t(j)djdi+EtfQt;t+1Dt+1g  Dt+WtNt+Tt (2.3)
Here, Pi;t(j) is the price of good j imported from country i. Dt+1 is the nominal
gain in period t + 1 of the asset purchased at the end of period t, Wt is the nominal
wage and Tt denotes lump-sum taxes/transfers. These variables are denoted in units
of domestic currency and Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead
nominal gains of the consumer. We assume that asset markets are complete.
Before looking at the optimal allocation of consumption and labour as a result of
the period utility maximization, we analyze the optimal allocation of the households
consumption among di¤erent goods from di¤erent countries. Firstly, we look at the
optimal division of any given expenditure within each kind of goods. This optimization
results in
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CH;t(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
 
CH;t; Ci;t(j) =

Pi;t(j)
Pi;t
 
Ci;t (2.4)
for all i; j 2 [0; 1].
Secondly, we look at the optimal division of expenditure among imported goods
from di¤erent countries, which results in
Ci;t =

Pi;t
PF;t
 
CF;t (2.5)
for all i 2 [0; 1].
Finally, it can be seen that the optimal division of expenditure among domestic and
imported goods gives
CH;t = (1  )

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct; CF;t = 

PF;t
Pt
 
Ct (2.6)
The price indexes used in these equalities are as follows,
Pt = [(1  )(PH;t)1  + (PF;t)1 ]
1
1  is the CPI (consumer price index),
PH;t =
R 1
0
PH;t(j)
1 dj
 1
1 
is the domestic price index,
Pi;t =
R 1
0
Pi;t(j)
1 dj
 11 
is the price index for goods imported from country i, for
all i 2 [0; 1],
PF;t=
R 1
0
P 1 i;t di
 1
1 
is the price index for imported goods, given in domestic cur-
rency.
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Using equation (2.4), one can arrive at the conclusion that
Z 1
0
PH;t(j)CH;t(j)dj = PH;tCH;t;
Z 1
0
Pi;t(j)Ci;t(j)dj = Pi;tCi;t
Furthermore, using equation (2.5) it can be seen that
R 1
0
Pi;tCi;tdi = PF;tCF;t.
Finally, utilizing equation (2.6), it can be noticed that the total expenditure on
consumption will be given by PH;tCH;t + PF;tC F;t = PtCt.
Making use of all these facts, the period budget constraint can be expressed as
PtCt + EtfQt;t+1Dt+1g  Dt +WtNt + Tt (2.7)
Accordingly, the following optimality conditions for the households maximization
problem should hold,
 Uc;t
Un;t
=
Wt
Pt
(2.8)
which shows that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours
worked should be equal to the real CPI based wage, and


Ct+1
Ct
  
Pt
Pt+1

= Qt;t+1 (2.9)
which indicates a positive relationship between the stochastic discount factor, Qt;t+1
and the ratio of the current consumption to the one in future, Ct
Ct+1
, everything else being
equal.
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Taking conditional expectations on both sides of equation (2.9) and using the fact
that Rt = 1=EtfQt;t+1g, the consumption Euler equation can be obtained as follows,
RtEt
(
Ct+1
Ct
  
Pt
Pt+1
)
= 1 (2.10)
Here, Rt is the gross riskless return on a one-period discount bond that yields one
unit of domestic currency and hence, EtfQt;t+1g is its price.
After examining the optimization by households, to present an analysis of the equi-
librium, it is necessary to make some assumptions, give denitions, and compute some
identities:
1) Terms of Trade
To start with, the bilateral terms of trade between the domestic economy and coun-
try i is dened as follows,
Si;t =
Pi;t
PH;t
The e¤ective terms of trade is then dened by
St =
PF;t
PH;t
=
Z 1
0
(S1 i;t di)
1
1 
St gives us the relative price of imported goods and can be approximated by the
following log-linearization,
st =
Z 1
0
si;tdi (2.11)
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2) Law of One Price
After dening i;t as the bilateral nominal exchange rate (the price of country i s
currency in terms of home currency), with the assumption of law of one price, we have
Pi;t(j) = i;tP
i
i;t(j)
for all i; j 2 [0; 1]. Here, P ii;t(j) denotes the price of country is good j expressed in
country is currency.
3) The Relationship between CPI ination, Domestic Ination and
the Terms of Trade
Log-linearizing the CPI formula around a symmetric steady state that satises the
purchasing power parity (PPP), PH;t = PF;t yields
pt = (1  )pH;t + pF;t = pH;t + st (2.12)
Then, domestic ination, H;t and CPI ination, t can be dened as H;t = pH;t  
pH;t 1 and t = pt   pt 1, respectively and using equation (2.12), it can be seen that
they are related as,
t = H;t + st (2.13)
Accordingly, it can be noticed that the CPI and domestic ination are linked to each
other by the percent change in the terms of trade, and the coe¢ cient of this change is
.
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4) The Relationship between the Exchange Rate and Terms of Trade
When the implication of law of one price that Pi;t(j) = i;tP ii;t(j) is inserted into the
denition of Pi;t, we have
Pi;t = i;tP
i
i;t
where P ii;t =
R 1
0
P ii;t(j)
1 dj
 11 
.
Afterwards, dening et =
R 1
0
ei;tdi as the (log) nominal e¤ective exchange rate, and
pt =
R 1
0
pii;tdi as the (log) world price index, plugging the expression of Pi;t into the
denition of PF;t and log-linearizing around the symmetric steady state, the following
expression is obtained,
pF;t = et + p

t
Merging the previous result and the denition of the terms of trade gives the fol-
lowing formula,
st = et + p

t   pH;t (2.14)
Then using the denition of the bilateral real exchange rate with country i, & i;t =
i;t
P it
Pt
, (log) real e¤ective exchange rate can be dened as follows,
qt =
Z 1
0
 
ei;t + p
i
t   pt

di = et + p

t   pt = (1  )st
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where qi;t = log & i;t:
As a result, we end up with a relationship between the terms of trade and the real
exchange rate.
5) The Relationship between Domestic Consumption, World Con-
sumption and the Terms of Trade
With the assumption of complete asset markets, we can obtain a relation between
domestic consumption, world consumption and the terms of trade. Complete asset
markets eliminates any di¤erences in the marginal utilities of income across periods
and states. Hence, the e¢ ciency condition for holdings of bonds for a representative
household must hold in any given country. Accordingly, for country i, the following
expression can be obtained,


Cit+1
Cit
  
P it
P it+1

it
it+1

= Qt;t+1
Merging (2.9) with the relation above and the denition of the real exchange rate
gives
Ct = iC
i
t&
1

i;t (2.15)
with i dened as a constant which will change according to the initial conditions
regarding relative net asset positions. When log on both sides of (2.15) are taken and
integrated over i, the following expression is obtained,
ct = c

t +
1  

st (2.16)
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where ct is the (log) world consumption index.
6) Uncovered interest parity
Under the same assumption of completeness, we can obtain a version of the uncov-
ered interest parity as
Et

Qt;t+1

Rt  Rit

i;t+1
i;t

= 0
When the following equation is log-linearized around a symmetric perfect foresight
steady state, and aggregated over i, the following expression is obtained2,
rt   rt = Etfet+1g (2.17)
2.2.2 Firms
After the analysis of the households behaviour and the explanation of the identities
and assumptions related to the international economy, an analysis of the supply side
follows. As in any other New Keynesian (NK) model, our model incorporates imperfect
competition and nominal rigidities into a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
Each monopolistic rm in the home economy produces a di¤erentiated good using
the following production function,
Yt(j) = AtNt(j)
2In the symmetric perfect foresight steady state, C = C, S = 1 and no risk premium exists (Gali
and Monacelli, 2005).
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where j 2 [0; 1] is a rm-specic index and At represents productivity. In the model,
at = logAt is assumed to be determined by a rst order autoregressive process given by
at = aat 1 + 
a
t
Cost minimization is common across monopolistic rms and implies
MCtAt
PH;t
=
Wt
PH;t
Hence, the real marginal cost can be expressed as
mct = wt   pH;t   at (2.18)
The other Keynesian element in the model is the staggered price-setting á la Calvo
(1983). Accordingly, it is assumed that 1   percent of rms changes their prices each
period, with an individual rms probability of adjusting its price in any given period
being random. Prot maximization by the typical rm adjusting its price in period t
yields the optimal price-setting behaviour, which can be approximated by the following
rule
paH;t = + (1  )
1X
k=0
()kEtfmct+k + pH;tg (2.19)
Here, paH;t refers to the (log of) adjusted domestic price, and  = log
 

 1

denotes
the (log of) mark-up in the steady state.
It can be seen that rms select their prices as a mark-up over a weighted average of
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expected future marginal costs. This assumption regarding the price adjustment also
results in the forward looking nature of ination, which is an important property of the
NK models. As explained above, rms have constraints on the frequency with which
they can change their prices. Hence, rms adjusting their prices today are aware of
the fact that the prices they choose are likely to remain constant for more than one
period and they take this into account in their pricing decisions. As changes in the
aggregate price level are a result of these current decisions, ination needs to have a
forward looking component (Gali, 2002).
Consequently, the dynamics of domestic ination in terms of the real marginal cost
are given by
H;t = EtfH;t+1g+ (mct  mc) (2.20)
where  = (1 )(1 )

; and mc is the (log) marginal cost in the steady state.
2.2.3 The Equilibrium
After the analysis of the demand and the supply side of the economy, the equilibrium
dynamics are explained. In equilibrium, goods market in the small open economy should
clear,
Yt(j) = CH;t(j) +
Z 1
0
CiH;t(j)di
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Yt(j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t
  "
(1  )

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct + 
Z 1
0
 
PH;t
i;tP iF;t
!  
P iF;t
P it
 
Citdi
#
(2.21)
for all j 2 [0; 1] and all t. Here, CiH;t(j) refers to country is demand for good j pro-
duced in the home economy and equation (2.21) can be obtained with the assumption
of symmetric preferences between countries.
Dening the index for aggregate domestic output, identical to the one for consump-
tion, as
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt(j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
and using this denition in equation (2.21) gives
Yt = (1  )

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct + 
Z 1
0
 
PH;t
i;tP iF;t
!  
P iF;t
P it
 
Citdi
=

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct

(1  ) + 
Z 1
0
(SitSi;t)
 &
  1
i;t di

(2.22)
where the last equality makes use of equation (2.15). Here,
Sit = 
i
t
P iF;t
Pi;t
refers to the e¤ective terms of trade of country i,
Si;t =
Pi;t
PH;t
refers to the bilateral terms of trade between the home economy and
foreign country i.
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Under the general case, the following rst order log-linear approximation to (2.22)
around the symmetric steady state can be obtained as,
yt = ct + st + (   1

)qt
= ct +
!

st (2.23)
Here, ! =  + (1  )(   1) and we have made use of the fact R 1
0
sitdi = 0
3.
By aggregating this condition over all countries, a world market clearing condition
is obtained as,
yt =
Z 1
0
yitdi =
Z 1
0
citdi = c

t (2.24)
where yt is (log of) the index for world output and c

t is (log of) the index for world
consumption.
Merging (2.23) with (2.16) and (2.24) results in the following expression,
yt = y

t +
(1  ) + !

st (2.25)
Then log-linearizing equation (2.10), we get
ct = Etfct+1g   1

(rt   Etft+1g   ) (2.26)
3The proof of the fact that
R 1
0
sitdi = 0 can be found in Gali and Monacelli (2005).
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Here, lower case letters refer to the logs of the respective variables,  =  1   1
refers to the discount rate.
Making use of (2.26) and (2.23), we can obtain
yt = Etfyt+1g   1

(rt   Etft+1g   )  !

Etfst+1g
Using the relationship between CPI ination, domestic ination and the terms of
trade given in Section 2.2.1, we can also get
yt = Etfyt+1g   1

(rt   EtfH;t+1g   )  

Etfst+1g
Finally, utilizing the relationship between domestic output, world output and the
terms of trade, we can obtain the relation between domestic output and the interest
rate,
yt = Etfyt+1g   (1  ) + !

(rt   EtfH;t+1g   ) + Etfyt+1g (2.27)
where  = (   1) + (1  )(   1) = !   1.
Following the analysis of the market clearing in the home country, examination of
the trade balance gives
nxt =
1
Y

Yt   Pt
PH;t
Ct

nxt is used to refer to the net exports denoted as a fraction of steady state output,
Y . A rst order approximation gives nxt = yt   ct   st. Merging this expression with
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(2.23), we obtain
nxt = 
!

  1

st (2.28)
As a result, whether there is a positive or a negative relationship between the terms
of trade and the net exports depends on the relative size of , , and .
We conclude the analysis of the equilibrium in the small open economy with the
specication of the real marginal cost as a function of domestic output. As given in
equation (2.18), the marginal cost in the small open economy can be expressed as
mct = wt   pH;t   at
and rewritten as
mct = wt   pt + pt   pH;t   at
= ct + 'nt + st   at
An approximate aggregate production function showing the relationship between
aggregate domestic output and aggregate employment is given by,
Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt(j)dj =
YtZt
At
and Zt =
Z 1
0
Yt(j)
Yt
dj
As shown in GM (2005), equilibrium changes in zt = logZt around the perfect
foresight steady state are of second order. Hence, the following aggregate relationship,
up to a rst order approximation is obtained as
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yt = at + nt (2.29)
Making use of (2.29), (2.16) and the fact that ct = y

t , the marginal cost as a
function of domestic and world output, terms of trade and productivity, is given by
mct = y

t + 'yt + st   (1 + ')at (2.30)
Accordingly, marginal cost increases as the terms of trade or world output increases.
When there is an increase in world output or terms of trade, domestic output increases.
As this increase is higher than that of terms of trade, consumption also rises. The
rise in consumption, in turn, causes households to perceive themselves wealthier and
hence supply less labour. Consequently, the decrease in the labour supply results in an
increase in the consumption wage, wt   pt, increasing the marginal cost. The increase
in the terms of trade also causes a straight increase in the product wage, wt   pH;t, for
any given real wage. Hence, it increases the marginal cost. The e¤ect of an increase
in labour productivity, for any given output, is a decrease in real wages, resulting in a
decrease in the marginal cost.
Using (2.25) to express st, the previous expression for the real marginal cost in terms
of domestic output, productivity, and world output can be dened as
mct = ( + ')yt + (   )yt   (1 + ')at (2.31)
where  =

1   + ! :
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2.2.4 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and the Dynamic IS
Equation
Before concluding section 2.2, we show that the equilibrium dynamics in this economy
can be expressed in terms of a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) and a dynamic
IS equation, as in any other NK model.
Firstly, to reach at the NKPC, the domestic output gap, xt is determined as the
di¤erence between the (log) domestic output yt and its natural level, ynt , which is dened
as the equilibrium level of output when nominal rigidities do not exist,
xt = yt   ynt
The natural level of domestic output can be obtained using the assumption that
mct =   for all t,
ynt = 
 +  at +  y

t (2.32)
where 
 =   
+'
;   =
1 + '
+'
and  =  
+'
:
Using equation (2.31), it can be seen the domestic real marginal cost and output
gap are linked as
mct  mc = ( + ')xt
This expression can be merged with equation (2.20) to get the NKPC for the small
open economy as a function of the output gap,
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H;t = EtfH;t+1g+ xt (2.33)
where  = ( + ').
The degree of openness,  has an impact on the magnitude of the slope of the Phillips
curve, . In the open economy, an increase in domestic output a¤ects marginal cost
through its a¤ect on employment, ' and the terms of trade, .
To obtain the dynamic IS equation for the open economy as a function of the output
gap, we make use of equation (2.27),
xt = Etfxt+1g   1

(rt   EtfH;t+1g   rnt ) (2.34)
where rnt =   (1  a)at +( + )Etfyt+1g is the natural rate of interest
in the small open economy.
The degree of openness has an e¤ect on the responsiveness of the output gap to in-
terest rate movements. When ! > 1, higher openness decreases  and hence, increases
the responsiveness. In addition, openness causes the natural interest rate to be a¤ected
by the world output growth.
2.3 Optimal Monetary Policy and the Welfare Loss
Function
Next, we explain the analytical derivation of the optimal allocation and the welfare
loss function in the small open economy. GM (2005) present this analysis under the
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special case. We derive the second order approximation to the welfare using generalized
parameters and present a comparison between the two welfare functions.
When it is assumed that a constant employment subsidy  , which eliminates the
rigidities regarding rmsmarket power exists in the closed economy, the only e¤ective
distortion that remains is sticky prices. In this case, when mark-ups are stabilized
at their steady state level, nominal rigidities are no longer binding, as rms do not
need to change prices. As a result, the equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient, and the price
level stays the same. Hence, the optimal monetary policy is the one that reproduces
the exible price equilibrium allocation (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). Unlike the
closed economy, there is an additional rigidity in the open economy, which is the central
banks incentive to a¤ect the terms of trade. This is possible as a result of the imperfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. Hence, in an open economy the
use of an employment subsidy that exactly eliminates monopolistic distortions is not
enough to make the exible price equilibrium allocation optimal (Benigno and Benigno,
2003). Under the special case where  =  =  = 1, the employment subsidy that
exactly o¤set the mixed e¤ects of the distortions caused by the market power of rms
and the central banks incentive to inuence the terms of trade can be computed, which
in turn results in the exible price equilibrium allocation to be optimal.
The social planners objective is to maximize utility, U(Ct; Nt) subject to the con-
straints on resources. These are given by the technological constraint, the international
risk sharing condition and the market clearing condition (GM, 2005).
In the special case of  =  =  = 1, the optimal allocation (when world output
and consumption are taken as given), needs to satisfy
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 (@U(Ct; Nt)=@N)
(@U(Ct; Nt)=@C)
= (1  )Ct
Nt
and with  = 1, this results in constant employment, N = (1  ) 11+' :
In our analysis, ,  and  are specied to be di¤erent from 1. The optimal allocation
then satises
 (@U(Ct; Nt)=@N)
(@U(Ct; Nt)=@C)
=
1  
1   + !
Ct
Nt
and employment is obtained as N1+'t =
1  
1   + !C
1 
t :
Under the special case, the exible price equilibrium in the small open economy
satises
1  1

= MCnt
= (1  )(Nnt )1+'
where variables in the exible price equilibrium have an n superscript,  is the
employment subsidy and Nnt = N = (1  )
1
1+' .
By specifying  such that (1 )(1 ) = 1  1

is satised, it is guaranteed that the
exible price equilibrium allocation is optimal. Consequently, as in the closed economy,
the optimal monetary policy demands stabilization of the output gap and the domestic
prices. Hence, under the special case, strict domestic ination targeting is optimal in
the small open economy.
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On the other hand, under the general case, it is not possible to determine the
subsidy that will guarantee the optimality of the exible price equilibrium. As a result,
the monopolistic distortion and the terms of trade externality remain present and we
cannot directly conclude that strict domestic ination targeting is the optimal monetary
policy.
Following the exploration of the optimal allocation, we derive the welfare loss func-
tion in the open economy. Under the special case, it is easy to compute a second order
approximation to the utility losses of the domestic representative consumer. These
losses, under the special case, given as a fraction of steady state consumption, can be
expressed as4
W =  1  
2
1X
t=0
t
 

2H;t + (1 + ')x
2
t

On the other hand, as shown in Appendix A, under the new specication, the welfare
losses will be given by
W 0 =  1
2
[(1 + ')    (1  )]
1X
t=0
tc^2t  
!

2 (1 + ')
2
1X
t=0
ts^2t  

2
1X
t=0
t2H;t
+(1  )
" 1X
t=0
tc^t   (1  )

1X
t=0
ts^t   (1  )(1 + ')

1X
t=0
tc^ts^t
#
(2.35)
where  =
1  
1   + ! = 1  and  denotes the size of the steady state distortion.
c^t and s^t are the deviation of consumption and the terms of trade from their respective
steady state values.
4The derivation of the welfare loss function under the special case is shown in Gali and Monacelli
(2005), Appendix D.
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Using the second order approximation to the utility losses of the domestic consumer,
the expected welfare losses under the special case are obtained as,
L =  1  
2
h 

var(H;t) + (1 + ')var(xt)
i
while the expected welfare losses under a generic case are approximated by (see
Appendix A for details),
L0 ~=  1
2
[(1 + ')    (1  )] var(ct) 
!

2 (1 + ')
2
var(st)  
2
var(H;t) (2.36)
As is clear from above, there are important di¤erences between the two welfare
losses. Under the special case, the variation in output is only proportional to the
variation in consumption5. Hence, the welfare losses in the closed and the open economy
have the same functional form. However, under the generic case, the variation in output
is proportional to the variation in consumption, in addition to the variation in the terms
of trade. Moreover, the presence of distortions in the steady state alter the relative
weights of these variations.
The new approximation to the welfare can be used to compare the welfare implica-
tions of alternative monetary policy rules and to rank those rules based on their welfare
outcomes.
2.3.1 Simple Monetary Policy Rules
When comparing the implications of a set of simple monetary policy rules for the
small open economy, we add two alternatives to the rules used by GM (2005). As the
5Under the special case, ct = (1  )yt + yt , Gali and Monacelli (2005), Appendix D.
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uctuations in the terms of trade (TOT) are also important in the open economy as
is seen in (2.36), interest rate rules that react to the movements in both the terms of
trade and domestic ination are added to our comparison. Table 2.1 presents the rules
used in our analysis.
Table 2.1. Simple Monetary Policy Rules
Domestic ination (DI) based Taylor rule (DITR) rt = + HH;t
CPI ination based Taylor rule (CITR) rt = + t
Exchange rate peg (PEG) et = 0
DI & TOT based Taylor rule (DITTR) rt = + HH;t + s;tst
DI & lagged TOT based Taylor rule (DITTR ( -1)) rt = + HH;t + s;tst + s;t 1st 1
2.4 Calibration
Existing empirical work on international monetary policy reveals that the case where
 =  =  = 1 does not receive much empirical support. Moreover, when the special
parameterization is in place, some open economy properties in the model disappear. In
this case, the domestic real marginal cost is una¤ected by the changes in world output.
In addition, the slope coe¢ cients of the Phillips Curve and the IS Equation are identical
to the ones in the closed economy. For the given reasons, this study uses a more general
calibration and analyzes whether the results obtained under the special case still hold.
The model calibration is summarized in Table 2.2.
In our calibration, to set the values for ,  and , we use the behavioural parameters
given in the Global Trade Analysis Project Database6. The chosen value of  is also in
6Global Trade Analysis Project is a global network of researchers and policy makers conducting
quantitative analysis of international policy issues. The elasticities in their database are computed
econometrically.
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Table 2.2 Parameters
 6 Elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the same country
 3 Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods
 6 Elasticity of substitution between imported goods from di¤erent origins
 1.1 Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
' 1.7 Inverse elasticity of labour supply
 0.4 Degree of openness
 0.99 Discount factor
 0.7 Degree of price stickiness
H 1.5 Ination coe¢ cient of the Taylor rule
s;t 0.5 Terms of trade coe¢ cient of DITTR
s;t 1 -0.2 Lagged terms of trade coe¢ cient of DITTR(-1)
line with Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2007), while the value of  is also consistent with
Jomini et al (1999) and Liu et al (2003).
For the calibration of the other parameters, the values used in Bank of Canadas
Terms-of-Trade Economic Model (ToTEM) are taken as reference, as Canada is con-
sidered as a prototype small open economy. ToTEM is an open-economy, dynamic
stochastic general-equilibrium model used for principal projection and policy-analysis.
Accordingly, ' is set to 1.7, which implies a labour supply elasticity of 0.6. This value is
in the range given by Bargain et al (2012) and McClelland and Mok (2012) who present
a review of the research on labour supply elasticity. The elasticity of substitution be-
tween di¤erentiated goods (of the same origin),  is set as 6. Parameter  is set equal
to 0.7, which implies that prices are adjusted on average every three quarters and the
chosen value is also consistent with the study by Blinder et al (1998). We set  = 0.99,
in line with much of the literature, implying an annual interest rate of 0.04. The value
for  (the degree of openness) is taken as 0.4, the import/GDP ratio in Canada.
In the calibration of the interest rate rules, the original Taylor estimate is used and
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H and  are set equal to 1.5. Since uctuations in the exchange rate should be taken
into account for a small open economy, the terms of trade in the DITTR and DITTR
(-1) should have a non-zero coe¢ cient. More specically, we need to have s;t > 0
and s;t 1  0 . This is needed as an appreciation of the domestic currency should
result in a decrease in the domestic interest rate, i.e., currency appreciation tends to
be deationary. The coe¢ cients for the terms of trade in the interest rate rules, s;t
and s;t 1 are set to 0.5 and -0.2, respectively, to induce partial adjustment (Cavoli and
Rajan, 2006).
In order to allow a comparison of our results to the ones obtained by GM (2005),
the parameters estimated by the authors for productivity and world output shocks are
used:
at = 0:66at 1 + at a = 0:0071
yt = 0:86y

t 1 + 

t y = 0:0078
with corr(at ; 

t ) = 0:3:
2.5 Model Dynamics
2.5.1 Technology Shocks
The impulse responses to a 100 basis point increase in domestic productivity under
di¤erent policy rules are presented in Figure 2.1. Under all the specied rules, the
increase in domestic productivity results in an increase in the natural level of output,
which in turn decreases the output gap and domestic ination. As the world output
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and world consumption remain unchanged, the dynamics of domestic output and con-
sumption follow that of terms of trade. The movements in the interest rate depend on
the variables that the interest rate reacts to under each simple rule.
Figure 2.1. Impulse Responses to Technology Shocks
Most of the macroeconomic variables have qualitatively similar dynamics under the
DITR, DITTR and DITTR(-1). Under the additional policies, the initial decrease in
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domestic ination is magnied, while the initial increase in terms of trade is dampened.
This is a consequence of the nature of these policy rules, where the interest rate not
only reacts to the movements in the domestic ination but also to the changes in the
terms of trade. Under the CITR, the increase in domestic productivity demands a real
depreciation, which results in a rise in CPI ination. Since stabilization of CPI ination
is required under the CITR, this results in a smaller reaction of the terms of trade and
a hump-shaped pattern. Under the PEG, it is not possible to decrease the nominal rate
and let the currency depreciate. As a result, compared to the other rules, the increase
in consumption, output and the terms of trade are lower, leading to a greater fall in
the output gap. In addition, the stationarity of the terms of trade is reected in the
movements of domestic and CPI ination, as the exchange rate remains constant.
2.5.2 World Output Shocks
Figure 2.2 presents the impulse responses to a 100 basis point increase in world output
under di¤erent monetary rules. It should be mentioned that, with the special case
used by GM (2005), domestic ination and the interest rate are not a¤ected by the
movements in the world output under the DITR. As a result, the dynamics under the
alternative policy rules cannot be examined rigorously.
An increase in the world output generates a decline in the terms of trade. As a
result, exports of the domestic economy and domestic consumption decline, leading to
a decrease in domestic output. On the other hand, the increase in the world output,
given the terms of trade, results in an increase in the exports of the domestic economy
and domestic consumption. Under the generic calibration, the contractionary e¤ects on
domestic output are higher than the contractionary e¤ects on domestic consumption.
41
The dynamics of domestic ination under the DITTR and DITTR(-1) are qualitatively
di¤erent from the dynamics under the DITR. Under the two additional rules, the in-
crease in the world output leads to a smaller decrease in the terms of trade and domestic
output, resulting in an increase in domestic ination. Under the CITR, the increase in
world output results in an appreciation, and hence, a decline in CPI ination. Since
CPI ination should be stabilized under the CITR, this causes a smaller decrease in
Figure 2.2 Impulse Responses to World Output Shocks
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the terms of trade and a hump-shaped pattern. As the nominal exchange rate
remains unchanged under the PEG, the initial decrease in the terms of trade is the
smallest.
2.6 Volatilities and Welfare Losses
Table 2.3 presents the standard deviations of some macrovariables obtained under al-
ternative policy rules, when the economy is a¤ected by domestic and foreign shocks.
It can be seen that the volatility of the terms of trade is the lowest under the PEG,
as expected. With the use of the special case in GM (2005), the lower volatility of
the terms of trade achieved under a policy rule is reected in the higher volatility of
domestic ination obtained under the same rule.
Table 2.3. Volatilities under Di¤erent Monetary Policy Rules
DITR CITR PEG DITTR DITTR(-1)
Consumption 1.11 1.14 1.20 1.15 1.14
Domestic Ination 0.26 0.30 0.19 0.16 0.10
CPI ination 0.32 0.31 0.11 0.18 0.13
Terms of Trade 0.64 0.61 0.52 0.58 0.59
Note: Entries correspond to standard deviations in percentages.
However, under the general setting, this result does not hold, as the volatility of
ination achieved under the PEG is also quite low. With the special case, while world
output shocks have an e¤ect on domestic ination under the PEG, this e¤ect is not
present under the DITR. On the other hand, under the general case, domestic ination
is a¤ected by both shocks under both policy rules. Consequently, when the generic case
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is used, the variance of domestic ination increases under the DITR. However, under
the PEG, the lower variance of the terms of trade is reected in the lower variance of
ination, since the exchange rate remains constant. The volatility of domestic ination
is the lowest under DITTR(-1). Moreover, under the additional rules, the volatility of
both the terms of trade and domestic ination are lower than the volatility obtained
under the DITR.
Finally, we present the welfare losses obtained under each policy rule in Table 2.4.
These losses are given for three cases, where the economy is a¤ected by: (i) domestic
shocks only, (ii) foreign shocks only or (iii) both shocks. As the existence of foreign
shocks increases the relative importance of the volatility of the terms of trade, the
preferred policy rule for the small open economy changes under the considered scenarios.
For the rst case, the smallest welfare loss is obtained under the CITR, while it is
obtained under the DITTR(-1) for the second and the third case. Hence, the source
of the uctuations in economic activity is a determinant of the preferred policy rule in
the small open economy.
Table 2.4. Welfare Losses under Di¤erent Monetary Policy Rules
Productivity Shocks World Output Shocks Both Shocks
DITR -0.001266 -0.012541 -0.012822
CITR -0.001045 -0.012692 -0.013227
PEG -0.001111 -0.009958 -0.009861
DITTR -0.001443 -0.010006 -0.010248
DITTR (-1) -0.001254 -0.009542 -0.009790
Note: Results are given in percentage units of steady state consumption.
In contrast to the results achieved by GM (2005), where the DITR generates the
smallest welfare losses in the presence of both shocks, the smallest welfare loss is
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achieved under the DITTR(-1). In addition, use of the DITTR and DITTR(-1) results
in a lower welfare loss than the use of the DITR. Hence, in the small open economy,
interest rate rules that react to the movements in the terms of trade and domestic
ination are preferred to the DITR.
2.6.1 Sensitivity Analysis
As presented in the previous section, the calibration of the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion (), the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods (), and
the elasticity of substitution between foreign goods from di¤erent origins () is quite
important for determining the preferred monetary policy rule in the small open economy.
Hence, in this section, we examine how the preferred policy rule changes with di¤erent
values of these parameters. We use the case where the economy experiences both
domestic and foreign shocks. We change the value of one of these parameters, keeping
the others equal to 1 (1.1 for ) and report the welfare losses obtained under each
policy7. Table 2.5 presents our results.
First, we analyze the results for di¤erent values of . It can be seen that the DITR
is the preferred policy rule, for values of  below 5. For higher values, use of the
DITTR(-1) generates the lowest welfare losses. In addition, as the value of  increases,
use of the PEG results in lower welfare losses than the use of the CITR. As the value
of  increases, the coe¢ cients for the variance of the terms of trade and the variance of
domestic ination in the welfare loss function decreases. However, the relative decline
in the coe¢ cient of ination is much higher. As a result, the relative importance of the
7Since we do not want to restrict ourselves to the case of log-utility obtained under  = 1, we keep
the value of  very close to, but not equal to 1, as in our generic calibration.
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variation in the terms of trade increases and results in a change in the ranking of the
policy rules.
Examining the welfare losses obtained for di¤erent values of , we observe that the
DITR is the preferred policy rule when  is lower than 4. For the remaining values,
the lowest welfare loss is obtained under the DITTR(-1). In addition, use of the PEG
results in lower welfare losses than the use of the DITR, for values of  above 4. This
is as a result of the increase in the coe¢ cient of the terms of trade and the decrease in
the coe¢ cient of domestic ination in the welfare loss function, as the value of  rises.
Table 2.5. Welfare Losses with Di¤erent Values of ,  and 
2 3 4 5 6
 DITR 0.0221 0.0314 0.0426 0.0551 0.0440
CITR 0.0304 0.0461 0.0645 0.0829 0.0779
PEG 0.0349 0.0466 0.0575 0.0716 0.0632
DITTR 0.0583 0.0702 0.1070 0.0972 0.0869
DITTR(-1) 0.0299 0.0363 0.0441 0.0528 0.0367
 DITR 0.0166 0.0161 0.0157 0.0154 0.0153
CITR 0.0178 0.0172 0.0167 0.0166 0.0160
PEG 0.0213 0.0184 0.0163 0.0147 0.0139
DITTR 0.0357 0.0263 0.0209 0.0179 0.0157
DITTR(-1) 0.0206 0.0169 0.0150 0.0134 0.0129
 DITR 0.0162 0.0155 0.0165 0.0150 0.0140
CITR 0.0174 0.0166 0.0160 0.0150 0.0143
PEG 0.0193 0.0161 0.0139 0.0123 0.0113
DITTR 0.0279 0.0214 0.0157 0.0136 0.0120
DITTR(-1) 0.0192 0.0142 0.0129 0.0119 0.0111
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Finally, we examine the results for di¤erent values of . DITR is the preferred
policy rule only for values of  below 3. For the remaining values, use of the DITTR(-
1) generates the lowest welfare losses. In addition, for values of  above 3, the highest
welfare losses are obtained under the DITR and the CITR. This result is again due to
the increase in the coe¢ cient of the terms of trade and the decrease in the coe¢ cient
of domestic ination in the welfare loss function, as the value of  increases.
To summarize, we observe that the relative importance of the variation in the terms
of trade increases, while that of domestic ination decreases, with an increase in the
values of the aforementioned parameters. As a result, the DITTR(-1) becomes the
preferred policy rule in the small open economy. Examining the change in the welfare
losses obtained with an increase in the value of each parameter, it can be seen that the
DITTR(-1) turns into the preferred policy rule with a slight and a moderate increase in
 and , respectively. For the same result to hold for di¤erent values of , a signicant
increase is required.
2.7 Conclusions
Generalizing the special setting used in GMs (2005) framework, we explore the optimal
monetary policy in the New Keynesian small open economy. With the special case, it
is possible to determine the subsidy which will exactly balance the combined impacts
of the market power and the terms of trade rigidities, and guarantee the optimality of
the exible price equilibrium allocation. Consequently, as in the closed economy, the
optimal monetary policy demands stabilization of the output gap, which then requires
domestic prices to be stabilized under the optimal policy. Under the general case in the
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open economy, we show that it is not possible to determine this subsidy. As a result, the
presence of a monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality pushes optimal
policy away from domestic ination targeting. Deriving the welfare loss function in the
open economy, we also nd that there are important di¤erences between the welfare
losses obtained under the general and the special case. Under the general setting,
welfare losses depend on the variance of the terms of trade, consumption and ination.
Hence, monetary policy for the open economy is not isomorphic to the one for the closed
economy.
Analyzing the equilibrium properties of various macroeconomic variables under dif-
ferent policy rules, we nd that the main di¤erence between our results and those
obtained with the special case is regarding the volatility of ination achieved under the
PEG and under the ination based Taylor rule (DITR). With the special case, while the
shock to world output has an e¤ect on domestic ination under the PEG, this e¤ect
is not present under the DITR. As a result, when the special case is used, the vari-
ance of domestic ination is only due to the shock to domestic productivity under the
DITR. On the other hand, under the general case, domestic ination is inuenced by
both shocks under both simple rules. Consequently, when the general case is used, the
variance of domestic ination increases because of the shock to world output under the
DITR. In contrast, the lower variance in the terms of trade results in a lower variance in
ination under the PEG, as the exchange rate remains constant. Hence, the volatility
of ination obtained under the PEG is lower than the volatility obtained under the
DITR, in contrast to the special case. Adding two alternative domestic ination and
terms of trade based Taylor rules (DITTR and DITTR(-1)) to our analysis, we also
observe that the lowest volatility of ination is achieved under the DITTR(-1).
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Finally, computing the welfare losses obtained under each policy rule in the open
economy, we nd that the welfare levels associated with di¤erent monetary policy rules
depend on the exogenous shock a¤ecting the small open economy. When both domestic
and foreign shocks are present, the use of domestic ination and terms of trade based
Taylor rules are preferred to the use of the DITR. Moreover, the lowest welfare losses
are obtained under the DITTR(-1).
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Chapter 3
A Comparative Analysis of
Macroprudential Policies
3.1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis has recast the literature on macroeconomic models and poli-
cies. The mainstream dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models used by
macroeconomists before the crisis did not contain the role of nancial frictions in gen-
erating or propagating business cycle uctuations. Subsequent to the 2007-09 episode,
there has been a growing consensus among macroeconomists about the necessity to in-
corporate nancial frictions into macroeconomic models and to examine the signicance
of nancial shocks. Two relevant strands of the literature, based on DSGE models that
attempt to overcome these shortcomings, have emerged. The rst analyzes monetary
policy using models that include nancial frictions associated with the constraints of
non-nancial borrowers, making use of the nancial accelerator mechanism designed
by Bernanke et al (1999). The second studies nancial frictions linked to nancial in-
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termediaries and analyzes the function of bank capital in the monetary transmission
mechanism. The framework developed by Gertler and Karadi (2011) is one of the
leading examples.
The recent nancial crisis has also shown that a single policy objective, ination
stability, to be achieved with the use of a single policy instrument, the interest rate, is
not su¢ cient to guarantee the stability of the nancial system. As stated by the well-
known "Tinbergen principle", the number of independent instruments should at least
be equal to the number of policy objectives. Hence, following the recent experience,
the nancial accelerator mechanism has been increasingly employed in macroeconomic
studies that include supplementary policy instruments and a common nding emerges
from these: to reduce systemic risks and ensure the stability of the nancial system, the
main monetary policy instrument needs to be supported by additional tools, which are
referred to as macroprudential policy instruments (Bank for International Settlements,
2010).
There are, by now, relatively well-dened proposals for macroprudential policy tools.
Counter-cyclical capital requirements introduced by the Basel III reform package is one
of the prominent examples. A large number of countries, including the U.S. and the
EU, has completed the adoption of this instrument in the past few years1. Another well-
known example of macroprudential tools is the counter-cyclical reserve requirements.
In recent years, they have been increasingly used by central banks with the purpose
of accommodating credit in booms and relaxing liquidity constraints in contractions.
Among others, China, Brazil, Malaysia, Peru, Columbia and Turkey are some of the
1Progress Report on the Implementation of the Basel Regulatory Framework (as of October 2014).
The other countries are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland and Turkey.
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countries that have been using reserve requirements for this purpose (Montoro and
Moreno, 2011).
In this paper, using a New Keynesian general equilibrium model that incorporates
a banking sector, we compare the e¤ectiveness of three macroprudential policies and
their interaction with monetary policy. In our study, we include the aforementioned
widely-used macroprudential policies; reserve requirements and capital requirements,
and a third macroprudential policy tool, a regulation premium, whose formulation is
based on the assumption that macroprudential policies in general increase the costs
of nancial intermediaries, who in turn pass these costs onto borrowers (Unsal, 2013).
Our motivation is threefold. First, we complement the studies that analyze the use of
reserve requirements as a macroprudential policy tool. To examine the e¤ectiveness of
reserve requirements, Glocker and Towbin (2012) use a small open economy model with
nancial frictions, while Mimir et al (2013) use a model that includes nancial frictions
in the banking sector, but does not incorporate a monetary policy rule. In both studies,
welfare losses in the presence of reserve requirements are computed using ad-hoc loss
functions, whereas we use welfare maximizing monetary and macroprudential policies
in our analysis. Second, we also contribute to the literature on bank capital and cap-
ital requirements. Even though there are various studies that analyze the use capital
requirements employing models with a banking sector2, most of them lack a rigorous
welfare analysis. The two studies where optimized monetary and macroprudential pol-
icy rules are used as in our analysis are by Angeloni and Faia (2013) and by Christensen
et al (2011). However, the modeling of the banking sector in these studies is di¤erent
from ours. Last but not least, our paper is the rst to present a detailed comparative
2See, for example, Van den Heuvel (2008), Dib (2010), Angelini et. al (2011), Christensen et. al
(2011) and Angeloni and Faia (2013) .
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analysis of the given alternative macroprudential policies, in contrast to much of the
existing literature where the implications of the use of a single macroprudential policy
are analyzed.
To conduct our analysis, we build a monetary DSGE model in which the frictions
in the nancial intermediation process are as described in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
The nancial accelerator mechanism built in banksbalance sheet constraints features
a pecuniary externality, where bankers do not consider the fact that if they issued more
equity, they would decrease the risk of the banking sector. Hence, they accumulate
high levels of leverage, which amplies the negative e¤ects of exogenous shocks to the
economy. In other words, bankersinability to internalize the benets of equity nanc-
ing results in a decline in welfare and induces the need for macroprudential regulation
(Gertler et al, 2012). In our framework, reserve requirements and capital requirements
both increase the cost of deposits to banks, encouraging them to replace external -
nancing by equity nancing. An increase in the regulation premium is reected in the
increase in cost of borrowing to rms. In accordance with the literature, the macro-
prudential policy tools in our model are assumed to be counter-cyclical. To establish
comparability, all three instruments respond to the same nancial variable, which is the
total nominal credit growth in the economy, with the same intensity.
Our simulation results indicate that when the economy experiences a productivity
(TFP) or a nancial shock, the use of all the aforementioned macroprudential tools
mitigates the negative e¤ects of the given shocks to the economy. Each shock results
in a decrease in asset prices, which triggers the nancial accelerator mechanism. Since
banks are leveraged, the decrease in asset prices results in an amplied decline in their
net worth and a downturn in their balance sheets that increases their leverage ratios.
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The rise in the leverage ratios increases the spread, which is dened as the di¤erence
between the gross return to risky loans and the gross riskless return. The increase in
the spread, in turn, results in an increase in the cost of capital, which causes a further
decline in investment and asset prices. Finally, the decline in investment leads to a
decrease in aggregate output. When counter-cyclical reserve requirements or capital
requirements are used in combination with monetary policy, the decrease in banksnet
worth and hence their leverage ratios is smaller, and so is the increase in the spread.
As a result, the negative e¤ects of the shocks on assets prices, investment and output
are lower. Counter-cyclical use of the regulation premium, on the other hand, directly
results in a smaller increase in the cost of capital. Consequently, the negative e¤ects of
the shocks on aggregate output are again lowered.
Comparing the dynamics of both shocks under alternative macroprudential policies,
we nd that irrespective of the cause of the decline in economy activity, capital require-
ments perform the best in lowering the negative e¤ects of the given shocks to the spread,
asset prices and investment. As a result, they are the most e¤ective macroprudential
tool in mitigating the negative e¤ects of the nancial accelerator mechanism built in
banksendogenous capital constraints.
Using welfare-maximizing monetary and macroprudential policy rules, we also com-
pute welfare losses and consumption equivalents under each policy alternative. Ana-
lyzing productivity and nancial shocks separately, we observe that under both shocks,
the adoption of each macroprudential policy results in a decrease in the welfare loss.
The least e¤ective macroprudential policy tool is the regulation premium under the
TFP shock, while it is the reserve requirements under the nancial shock. The most
e¤ective macroprudential tool is, however, the same under both shocks; capital require-
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ments generate the highest positive e¤ect on welfare, regardless of the type of the shock
a¤ecting the economy.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 sets out the structure of
our model by giving a detailed description of the economic agents, the monetary policy
and the macroprudential policies. Section 3.3 presents our quantitative results, includ-
ing the discussion of impulse responses, the analysis of macroprudential toolsimpact
on volatilities and the computation of welfare losses. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Our framework is a monetary DSGE model with nominal rigidities. It contains a bank-
ing sector that is characterized by credit frictions à la Gertler and Karadi (2011). The
model economy is populated by households, banks, capital goods producers, wholesale
rms, retail rms, the scal authority and the central bank. We now proceed with a
detailed description of the economic agents in the economy.
3.2.1 Households
The population consists of a continuum of identical households. Within the household,
there are 1-p "workers" and p "bankers" who perfectly insure each other. Workers
supply labour and earn wages while bankers manage nancial intermediaries, i.e., banks
and transfer dividends back to households. Households deposit their savings in the
banks. Deposits are assumed to be riskless one period securities.
A representative household maximizes expected discounted utility which is a func-
tion of consumption, Ct, Ct 1 and leisure, Lt,
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E0
1X
t=0
tUt(Ct; Ct 1;Lt) (3.1)
subject to the following ow of funds constraint,
Ct = Wtht + t   Tt +RtDt 1  Dt (3.2)
where 0<<1 is the subjective discount factor and E is the expectation operator.
Wt is the wage rate, ht(= 1  Lt) denotes hours worked, Dt bank deposits and Rt the
gross risk free deposits rate, set in period t   1 to pay out interest in period t. Tt is
the lump sum taxes remitted by the government and t is the prots earned from the
ownership of banks and rms.
Solution of the utility maximization problem of households gives the following op-
timality conditions,
UC;t = Rt+1Et [UC;t+1] (3.3)
Uh;t
UC;t
=  UL;t
UC;t
=  Wt (3.4)
where Ut =
(Ct Ct 1)(1 %)(1 )(1 ht)%(1 ) 1
1  .
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), we include habit formation and investment
adjustment costs in our model, since empirical work has demonstrated that such real
frictions improve the ability of macroeconomic models to explain U.S. business cycles.
The given form of the utility function is also adopted from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
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(2007). Various other studies show that non-separable preferences over consumption
and leisure explain the aggregate consumption data well3.
Equation (3.3) describes the optimal consumption-savings decision. Accordingly,
the marginal utility from consuming one unit of income in period t is equal to the
discounted marginal utility from consuming the gross income obtained by saving.
Taking expectations on both sides and dening t;t+1 = 
UC;t+1
UC;t
as the real sto-
chastic discount factor over the interval [t; t+ 1], we obtain the consumption Euler
equation,
1 = Rt+1Et [t;t+1] (3.5)
Equation (3.4) shows that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure should be equal to the real wage.
3.2.2 Banks
The modelling of the nancial sector closely follows that in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
A representative bank supplies credit to wholesale rms and nances this activity by
borrowing from households and using its own net worth. As a result, the banks balance
sheet has the following form,
Qtst = nt + dt (3.6)
where st denotes loans to non-nancial rms, Qt their price, nt net worth and dt
household deposits.
3See Kilponen (2009) for a survey of these studies.
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The balance sheet of the bank implies an accumulation of net worth according to
nt = Rk;tQt 1st 1  Rtdt 1 (3.7)
To eliminate the case where bankers can accumulate su¢ cient net worth that makes
their nancial constraints not binding, we assume that with probability 1-, a banker
exits and becomes a worker. The bank pays dividends only when it exists. In addition,
we assume that (1-)p workers randomly become bankers so that the number of both
professions stays constant.
Given the fact that the bank only pays dividends when it exists, the bankers ob-
jective at the end of period t is to maximize expected discounted terminal net worth,
given by
Vt = Et
1X
i=1
(1  )i 1t;t+int+i (3.8)
Substituting for dt from Equation (3.6) in Equation (3.7) gives another form of net
worth accumulation,
nt = Rtnt 1 + (Rk;t  Rt)Qt 1st 1 (3.9)
Since the returns and Qt are exogenous to the bank, given nt 1 at the beginning of
period t, net worth in period t is given by the choice of fst+ig subject to the banks
borrowing constraint.
The nancial friction in the banking sector is based on a moral hazard problem be-
tween the banks and the households. After a bank obtains funds, the bankers manager
may transfer a fraction,  of total assets, Qtst for her own benet. In this case, the
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bank defaults on its debt, shuts down and the creditors can reclaim the remaining 1-
fraction of funds. As households know this possibility, they limit the funds (deposits)
that they lend to banks. As a result, the bankers choice of st at any time t is subject
to the following incentive constraint,
Vt  Qtst
To solve the banks optimization problem, we start by guessing that the solution
has the following form,
Vt = Vt(st; dt) = vs;tst   vd;tdt (3.10)
where vs;t and vd;t are time-varying marginal values of the assets at the end of each
period. By eliminating dt from Equation (3.10) using Equation (3.6), we obtain
Vt = Vt(st; nt) = s;tQtst + vd;tnt (3.11)
and s;t =
vs;t
Qt
  vd;t is the excess value of the banks assets over its deposits.
Dening t as the leverage ratio that satises the binding incentive constraint, we
have
Qtst = tnt (3.12)
where t =
vd;t
  s;t
:
Using the solution to the bankers optimization problem, we can determine vs;t and
vd;t as
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vs;t = Ett;t+1t+1Rk;t+1Qt
vd;t = Ett;t+1t+1Rt+1
As a result, we also have
s;t = Ett;t+1t+1 (Rk;t+1  Rt+1)
where t = (1  ) + (s;tt + vd;t) gives the shadow value of a unit of net worth.
t is a weighted average of the marginal values for exiting and surviving banks. If a
surviving bank has an additional net worth, it can save the cost of deposits, vd;t and
increase assets with an excess value of s;t by t.
The di¤erence between the gross return to risky loans, Rk;t and the gross riskless
return, Rt is dened as the spread, which is a distortion generated by the frictions in
the nancial sector.
Since t is not dependent on bank specic factors, we can aggregate Equation (3.12)
across individual banks to obtain the banking sector balance sheet at the aggregate level,
QtSt = tNt (3.13)
The evolution of net worth at the aggregate level depends on the net worth of
surviving bankers (No;t) and that of new entrants (Ne;t). Net worth of surviving bankers
is given by the earnings on their assets from the previous period minus the cost of
deposits, multiplied by the probability that they will survive () ;
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No;t = (Rk;tQt 1St 1  RtDt 1) (3.14)
And net worth of the new bankers is obtained with the assumption that the fraction
"
1   of the total value of the exiting bankersassets are transferred to new entrants,
Ne;t = "(Rk;tQt 1St 1) (3.15)
where " denotes the proportional transfer to the new bankers. As a result, the
evolution of net worth at the aggregate level is given by
Nt = Rk;t ( + ")Qt 1St 1   RtDt 1 (3.16)
3.2.3 Wholesale Firms
Wholesale rms combine capital acquired from capital producers and labour supplied
by households to produce the wholesale output, Y Wt using the production function
Y Wt = Y
W
t (At; ht;Kt 1) = (Atht)
K1 t 1 = Atht

Kt 1
Y Wt
 1 

(3.17)
Here, it should be noted that Kt is the end-of-period t capital stock and At denotes
factor productivity. Cost minimization by wholesale rms gives the following labour
demand function,
PWt
Pt
Y Wh;t = Wt (3.18)
Equation (3.18) shows that the marginal product of labour, Y Wh;t is equal to the real
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wage. Here PWt and Pt are the aggregate price indices in the wholesale and retail
sectors, respectively.
To nance its capital purchase each period, the rm obtains funds from banks. The
number of claims issued by the rm, St is equal to the number of units of capital needed,
Kt and hence the price of each claim is also equal to the price of each unit of capital,
QtSt = QtKt (3.19)
In obtaining funds from a bank, the wholesale rm does not face any additional
nancial frictions. However, the credit frictions between the households and the banks
have an e¤ect on the amount of funds available to wholesale rms. Because of perfect
competition, wholesale rms earn zero prots and hence they completely pay the return
on their capital,
Rk;t+1 =
(1  ) PWt+1YWt+1
Pt+1Kt
+ (1  )Qt+1
Qt
(3.20)
to the banks, where  is the depreciation rate of capital. It can be seen that the
demand for capital, Kt increases with a rise in the production or the price of the
wholesale good and decreases with an increase in the cost of capital, Rk;t+1.
3.2.4 Capital Producing Firms
Incorporation of capital producers enables us to explore the changes in the price of
capital and to introduce the capital quality shock, which is the exogenous shock that
initiates the nancial crisis in our model. We assume that at time t, It of raw output is
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converted into (1  S (Xt)) It of new capital. Here S (Xt) denotes the investment costs.
As a result, capital accumulates according to
Kt = [(1  )Kt 1 + (1  S (Xt)) It] (3.21)
where Xt =
It
It 1
. We assume that investment costs have the following form,
S (Xt) = XX
2
t
Accordingly, capital producing rms maximize expected discounted prots with
respect to fItg,
Et
1X
k=0
t;t+k [Qt+k (1  S (Xt+k)) It+k   It+k] (3.22)
The optimality condition that we achieve as a result of this maximization problem
is given by
Qt (1  S (Xt) XtS 0 (Xt)) + Et

t;t+1Qt+1S
0 (Xt+1)X2t+1

= 1 (3.23)
which indicates a positive relationship between investment and asset prices.
3.2.5 Retail Firms
We introduce two New Keynesian elements; price stickiness and monopolistic compe-
tition into our framework through retail rms. The retail sector uses the homogenous
wholesale output to produce a basket of di¤erentiated goods for consumption. Con-
sumersexpenditure minimization gives the following output demand equation for each
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retail rm,
Yt(f) =

Pt(f)
Pt
 
Yt (3.24)
where  is the elasticity of substitution and the aggregate price index, Pt is given
by Pt =
R 1
0
Pt (f)
1  df
1=(1 )
.
We include price stickiness in the retail sector with the assumption that rms set
their prices à la Calvo (1983). The optimal price-setting behaviour for each rm setting
its price in period t is obtained by the maximization of the retailers discounted nominal
prots,
Et
1X
k=0
kt;t+kYt+k(f) [P
a
t (f)  Pt+kMCt+k] (3.25)
subject to Equation (3.24). Here, MCt denotes the real marginal cost, P at (f) the
adjusted price and t;t+k = 
kUC;t+k=Pt+k
UC;t=Pt
the nominal stochastic discount factor over
the period [t; t+ k] : As described in Calvo (1983),  is the probability that a rm
cannot adjust its price in a given period, independent from the time passed since the
last adjustment.
Under the given price-setting mechanism, the evolution of the price index is given
by the weighted average of the previous price level and the newly adjusted price4,
P 1 t+1 = P
1 
t + (1  )
 
P at+1
1 
(3.26)
Combining the solution to the retail rms optimization problem and the evolution
4As the costs and the demand equations faced by each retail rm is the same, all the rms adjusting
their prices choose the same price. As a result, P at (f) = P
a
t .
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of the price index, we can obtain the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). The
NKPC indicates that ination in the current period rises as expected ination or the
marginal cost of the retail rm increases5.
3.2.6 Monetary Policy
The monetary policy instrument is the gross nominal interest rate, Rn;t set in period
t to pay out interest in period t + 1. The relationship between the nominal and real
interest rate is given by the following Fisher equation,
Rn;t 1 = RtEtt (3.27)
We suppose monetary policy is conducted using a simple Taylor rule given by,
log

Rn;t
Rn

=  log

t


+ y log

Yt
Y

(3.28)
where Rn denotes the steady state nominal rate,  the steady state ination and Y
the steady state level of output.
3.2.7 Macroprudential Policies
In our model we study the implications of using three di¤erent macroprudential policies;
reserve requirements, capital requirements and a regulation premium. Each policy is
characterized by a macroprudential policy rule.
5The set of equations that represent the NKPC are included in Appendix B.1, where the model
equations that describe the competitive equilibrium are presented.
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Reserve Requirements (RR)
According to reserve requirements, banks need to hold a portion of their deposits at
the central bank, which generally earns zero interest. Hence, such requirements can
be regarded as a tax that increases the cost of extending credit. If banks did not
need to hold non-interest-bearing reserves, they would probably use the extra funds to
supply more loans. This would, in turn, increase their interest income and improve
their protability, as it would result in a larger asset base for them to earn their spread
(Hein and Stewart, 2002). As a result, an increase in the central banks level of reserve
requirements can be considered to increase the return to deposits.
The holdings of reserves by banks beyond the required level are called excess reserves.
Before the global nancial crisis, reserves held with the Fed did not earn any interest
so banks had an inclination to minimize their holdings of excess reserves. In 2007, the
excess reserves held by U.S. banks were only about 0.3% above the requirement (Keister
and McAndrews, 2009). Since there are no gains from holding excess reserves, it can
be assumed that the cost of deposits to banks varies only with the level of the required
reserves imposed by the central bank. The change in the cost of deposits, in turn,
a¤ects the marginal values of a banks assets, and hence, the leverage of the nancial
sector (Areosa and Coelho, 2013).
Accordingly, we assume that when the central bank demands banks to hold a re-
quired ratio (rrt) of their deposits as non-interest-earning reserves, the rise in the cost of
deposits is reected as a change from Rt to
Rt   rrt
1  rrt . As a result, the new accumulation
of bank net worth will be given by
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nt = Rk;tQt 1st 1  

Rt   rrt
1  rrt

dt 1 (3.29)
It can be seen that when there is an increase in reserve requirements, the return to
deposits increases. Hence, banks are encouraged to substitute internal nancing (nt)
for external nancing (dt). To reect the changes in the banks maximization problem
as a result of the introduction of reserve requirements, we replace Rt, the gross return
to deposits with
Rt   rrt
1  rrt .
Consequently, in the presence of reserve requirements, the marginal value of the
banks loans is given by
vrrs;t = Ett;t+1
rr
t+1Rk;t+1Qt
whereas the marginal value of the banks deposits and the excess marginal value of
the banks loans over its deposits are now represented by
vrrd;t = Ett;t+1
rr
t+1

Rt+1   rrt
1  rrt

rrs;t = Ett;t+1
rr
t+1

Rk;t+1   Rt+1   rrt
1  rrt

rrt denotes the leverage ratio in the presence of reserve requirements and 
rr
t , the
shadow value of a unit of net worth, is now equal to (1  ) + (rrs;trrt + vrrd;t).
Moreover, the evolution of net worth at the aggregate level changes to
Nt = Rk;t ( + ")Qt 1St 1   

Rt   rrt
1  rrt

Dt 1 (3.30)
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We assume that the required reserves ratio follows a rule that reacts to the deviations
of the total nominal credit from its steady state value,
rrt   rr = rr

QtSt  QS
QS

(3.31)
Here, variables without any time subscript denote steady state values and we assume
that rr > 0. Consequently, when the total nominal credit in the economy is increasing,
the central bank demands banks to hold higher reserves, which increases the return to
deposits and encourages banks to prefer equity nancing. Hence, reserve requirements
are counter-cyclical. The macroprudential tools in our study respond to the uctuations
in the total nominal credit, since stabilizing the total credit is expected to reduce the
deviations in the spread. As the spread is an inter-temporal distortion created by
nancial frictions, the welfare level is expected to be higher when macroprudential
policy rules are used by the central bank.
Capital Requirements (CR)
Di¤erent from reserve requirements, macroprudential policy in the form of counter-
cyclical capital requirements focuses on the size of a banks balance sheet instead of
the composition of its assets. Capital requirements deal with the leverage of banks,
while reserve requirements address liquidity risk. When a banks capital ratio is below
the capital requirement, the macroprudential authority will enforce corrective measures
which can cause serious reputational costs and adverse market reactions. Hence, falling
below the capital requirement is extremely costly for a bank. Since capital requirements
reduce the ability of banks to supply credit by accepting deposits and limit the percent-
age of bank assets that can be nanced by issuing deposits, the increase in the banks
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funding cost in the presence of capital requirements can be regarded as an increase in
the cost of deposits (Borio and Zhu, 2012).
As reported in the study by Van den Heuvel (2008), capital adequacy ratios are
important determinants of the capital structure of U.S. banks. Majority of U.S. banks
hold some bu¤er of equity above the regulatory minimum since they would like to lower
the risk of a negative shock resulting in capital inadequacy. Most bank assets are in U.S.
banks with a ratio of at least 3% above the capital requirement. As a result, even though
both reserve requirements and capital requirements increase the costs to banks, the way
they do so is modelled di¤erently. The cost of capital requirements is given by the rst-
order derivative of a quadratic function of deviations from the required capital/assets
ratio. Positive (negative) deviations decrease (increase) the cost of deposits and larger
deviations result in higher changes in the banks cost. In this case, the banker would
like to issue as many loans as possible, increasing leverage and thus prots, with the
knowledge of the fact that when leverage increases, the capital/assets ratio can fall below
the requirement and the bank pays a cost. Consequently, when capital requirements
are in place, the banker will choose the banks optimal capital/assets ratio in line with
the prot maximization, while the quantity of reserves is determined essentially by the
central banks decisions.
In line with this interpretation, we formulate the return to deposits in the presence of
capital requirements as in Brzoza-Brzezina et al (2013). In this case, the accumulation
of banks net worth is given by,
nt = Rk;tQt 1st 1  
"
Rt  

1
crt
  crt

1
crt
2#
dt 1 (3.32)
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where
1
crt
is the inverse of the leverage ratio; the ratio of banks equity to its loans
in the presence of capital requirements. As a result, if a banks capital/assets ratio is
lower than the required ratio, it needs to pay a higher return to deposits, which induces
the bank to substitute internal nancing for external nancing.
Incorporating capital requirements in the banks prot maximization problem is
straightforward. This can be done by replacing the gross return to deposits by the
new gross return given in Equation (3.32). Accordingly, in the presence of capital
requirements, the marginal value of the banks loans and deposits are represented by,
vcrs;t = Ett;t+1
cr
t+1Rk;t+1Qt
vcrd;t = Ett;t+1
cr
t+1
"
Rt+1  

1
crt
  crt

1
crt
2#
while the excess marginal value of the banks loans over its deposits are now given
by
crs;t = Ett;t+1
cr
t+1
"
Rk;t+1  Rt+1 +

1
crt
  crt

1
crt
2#
The shadow value of a unit of net worth in the presence of capital requirements is
obtained as crt = (1  ) + (crs;tcrt + vcrd;t):
In addition, the evolution of net worth at the aggregate level changes to
Nt = Rk;t ( + ")Qt 1St 1   
"
Rt  

1
crt
  crt

1
crt
2#
Dt 1 (3.33)
The capital adequacy ratio also follows a rule that reacts to the deviations of total
nominal credit from its steady state value,
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crt   cr = cr

QtSt  QS
QS

(3.34)
where QS is the steady state level of nominal credit and cr is the steady state level
of the capital adequacy ratio. Again, the counter-cyclical nature of capital requirements
implies that cr > 0:
Regulation Premium (RP)
Finally, we turn to a more general representation of macroprudential policy. If banks
were competitive in the deposit market but they had market power in the loan mar-
ket, the marginal cost of deposits would be xed, while the demand schedule and the
marginal revenue for loans would be downward sloping. In this case an increase in the
cost of deposits would shift the marginal cost curve up. As a result, at the equilibrium,
the interest rate on loans would be higher and the level of credit would be lower. The
increase in the lending rates induced by macroprudential policies is called the "regula-
tion premium" (Unsal, 2013). The regulation premium can be interpreted as a tax that
increases the cost of borrowers. In the presence of reserve or capital requirements, the
costs relating to macroprudential policies are incurred by banks, while in the presence
of the regulation premium, these costs are incurred by borrowing rms.
Accordingly, the spread in the economy is now given by
spread =
Rk;t  Rt
1 + rpt
(3.35)
where rpt is the regulation premium. To be able to make a comparative analysis
of the three macroprudential policies, rpt also reacts to the deviations of total nominal
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credit from its steady state value, in line with rrt and crt,
rpt   rp = rp

QtSt  QS
QS

(3.36)
where we assume that rp > 0. As a result, when the total nominal credit in
the economy is lower, the cost of borrowing to rms decreases. Hence, the regulation
premium is also counter-cyclical.
3.2.8 Government Budget Constraint
We assume that government expenditures, Gt, are nanced by lump-sum taxes, Tt6,
Gt = Tt (3.37)
3.2.9 Exogenous Processes
We suppose that the model economy is a¤ected by two exogenous processes, which are
total factor productivity (TFP) and capital quality shocks. Both shocks are supposed
to follow an AR(1) process,
logAt   logA = A(logAt 1   logA) + "A
log t =  (log t 1) + " 
6We also maintain that the proceeds from the use of macroprudential policies are lumped into Tt.
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By incorporating the capital quality shock into the model, we can conduct a nancial
crisis experiment. Accordingly, the capital accumulation process (3.21) is now given by
Kt =  t+1 [(1  )Kt 1 + (1  S (Xt)) It] (3.38)
resulting in the following gross return to capital,
Rk;t =  t
(1  ) PWt YWt
PtKt 1
+ (1  )Qt
Qt 1
(3.39)
St = [(1  )Kt 1 + (1  S (Xt)) It] now gives the capital in process which is by
(3.38) transformed into capital for next periods production according to Kt =  t+1St.
As a result, the capital quality shock causes a wedge between capital and the capital
in process, where the evolution of capital in process is given by
St = [(1  ) tSt 1 + (1  S (Xt)) It] (3.40)
Capital quality shocks in New Keynesian models without any nancial sectors only
have an e¤ect on the accumulation of and the return to capital. With a banking sector
in place, they also have an e¤ect on the evolution of banks net worth. A negative
capital quality shock reduces the net worth, which results in the tightening of the
budget constraint. Accordingly, Equation (3.16) can now be rewritten as
Nt = Rk;t ( + ") tQt 1St 1   RtDt 1 (3.41)
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3.3 Quantitative Analysis
3.3.1 Calibration
The parameters used in the calibration of our model are given in Table 3.1. We start
by calibrating the non-nancial parameters. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), for the
labour share , the elasticity of substitution between goods , and the government
expenditure share, we choose conventional values. The steady state depreciation rate
, the habit parameter , and the price rigidity parameter  are also set in line with
the values used by Gertler and Karadi (2011). The parameters that are specic to our
model are  in the utility function and X in the investment cost function. The chosen
values for these parameters roughly reect the empirical literature. For calibrating the
discount factor , and the preference parameter %, we use typical U.S. observations of
0.35 for hours worked and 1.01 for the gross interest rate.
For calibrating the nancial parameters, we again follow values similar to those
used by Gertler and Karadi (2011). We choose the value of  so that the bankers
survive 10 years on average. The values of " and  are calibrated so that we will have
an economy wide leverage ratio of 4, which will roughly capture the aggregate data
and an average credit spread of 100 basis points per year, which is based on pre-2007
spreads between BAA corporate versus government bonds. Using conventional values,
we set the persistence parameter for the total factor productivity and the capital quality
shock, A and  as 0.95 and 0.75, respectively. Finally, the coe¢ cients of the Taylor
rule and the macroprudential policy rules are also presented in Table 3.1. To make our
three macroprudential experiments comparable, we assume that the coe¢ cient of the
macroprudential policy rule under each macroprudential instrument is the same. At
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Table 3.1. Parameters
Households
 0.987 Discount factor
 0.7 Habit parameter
 2 Preference parameter in the utility function
% 0.876 Preference parameter in the utility function
Wholesale Firms
 0.7 Labour share
 0.025 Depreciation rate
Capital Producing Firms
X 2 Coe¢ cient of adjustment costs
Retail Firms
 7 Elasticity of substitution
 0.75 Probability of keeping prices constant
Banks
 0.975 Probability that bankers survive
" 0.001 Proportional transfer to the new bankers
 0.410 Fraction of bank assets that can be diverted
Government
G
Y
0.2 Steady state share of government expenditures
Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Rules
 1.5 Ination coe¢ cient of the Taylor rule
y 0.5/4 Output gap coe¢ cient of the Taylor rule
rr = cr = rp 1.5 Coe¢ cient of the macroprudential policy rules
the steady state, required reserves ratio is determined as 0.06, while the capital
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adequacy ratio is set equal to 0.08, in line with the average values employed by the U.S.
Federal Reserve System.7
3.3.2 Model Dynamics
In the following subsections, we start by comparing the dynamics of negative TFP
shocks under alternative policy rules. First, we look at the behaviour of certain macro-
economic variables when only the monetary policy rule is used by the central bank. We
then analyze the behaviour of these variables when the monetary policy instrument is
used in combination with one of the macroprudential policy tools. Lastly, we conduct
a nancial crisis experiment, one that is triggered by a negative capital quality shock,
and compare the dynamics under the same alternatives.
Impulse Responses to TFP Shocks
Figure 3.1 illustrates the impulse responses under di¤erent policy rules when there is
a negative one percent change in domestic productivity. The unanticipated decline in
domestic productivity decreases investment and reduces asset prices, which triggers the
nancial accelerator mechanism. Since banks are leveraged, the decrease in asset prices
results in a decline in their net worth, which is multiplied by a factor equal to their
leverage ratio. As a result, banks experience a downturn in their balance sheets that
increases the leverage ratio and pushes up the spread. The rise in the spread increases
the cost of capital, which adds on to the decrease in investment and asset prices. The
overall decline in investment, in turn, decreases aggregate output.
7http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/default.htm, last accessed in January 2014.
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Figure 3.1. Impulse Responses to TFP Shocks under Di¤erent Policy Rules
The unanticipated decline in productivity also results in an increase in hours worked.
Due to the costs of adjustment in consumption and investment, neither of the two
variables move much on impact. As a result, the decrease in productivity must be
accompanied with a decrease in leisure large enough to ensure that output does not
decrease too much on impact. The increase in hours worked, in turn, results in an
increase in marginal cost and hence ination. With the use of the monetary policy
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rule only, since the weight of the movements in ination is higher than the weight of
the uctuations in output, the interest rate increases.
When macroprudential policy rules are used in combination with the monetary
policy rule, it can be seen that the negative e¤ects of the nancial accelerator mechanism
in the economy dampens. According to the reserve requirements rule, the fall in the
total nominal credit induced by the decline in productivity results in a decrease in the
required reserves. Hence, cost of extending loans for banks declines. As a result, banks
net worth decreases less, leading to a smaller increase in the leverage ratio and the
spread. Consequently, the negative e¤ects of the TFP shock on investment & output
are lower. In the presence of the capital requirements rule, the decrease in the total
nominal credit results in a decrease in the target capital adequacy ratio. Similar to
the case under the reserve requirements, this decline lowers the decrease in banks net
worth, which results in the negative e¤ects of the nancial accelerator mechanism to
be reduced. Finally, when the regulation premium is used, the decrease in the total
nominal credit lowers the premium. As a result, the cost of borrowing increases less,
leading to the depression of the productivity shocks negative e¤ects. When there is
a decrease in domestic productivity, it can be observed that counter-cyclical capital
requirements are the most e¤ective macroprudential tool in stabilizing output, since
their positive e¤ect on the spread, asset prices and investment is the largest.
The Financial Crisis Experiment
In our model, we postulate the negative capital quality (CQ) shock as the origin of
the nancial crisis as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The aim is to nd a shock that
a¤ects the quality of the nancial intermediariesassets, which will cause an amplied
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decrease in their net worth, because of their high level of leverage. In this way, we
can broadly mimic the dynamics of the sub-prime crisis. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the
impulse responses under alternative policy rules when the economy is a¤ected by a
negative one percent change in capital quality. As suggested by Equation (3.38), the
shock results in a decline in capital, which in turn reduces asset prices. In addition to
this negative e¤ect, the capital quality shock also causes a decline in banksnet worth,
as given by Equation (3.41). As a result, banksleverage ratios increase and so does
the spread and the cost of borrowing. The increase in the cost of borrowing results in a
further reduction in asset prices and investment. The fall in investment in turn, leads
to a decrease in aggregate output and hours worked. The decline in factor demands due
to the contraction in production reduces PWt , the retail sectors marginal cost. Hence,
ination decreases. As a response to the decrease in ination and aggregate output,
the central bank lowers the interest rate.
When used in combination with the monetary policy, all counter-cyclical macro-
prudential policies dampen the negative e¤ects of the nancial accelerator mechanism.
They achieve this by lowering the decline in banksnet worth, asset prices and invest-
ment. Capital requirements once again, mitigate the negative e¤ects of the nancial
shock on output the most, since they perform the best in lowering the negative ef-
fects to the spread, asset prices and investment. When compared with the TFP shock,
the capital quality shock results in a higher reduction in asset prices. As a result, all
three macroprudential instruments are required to decrease more when the economy
experiences a nancial crisis.
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Figure 3.2. Impulse Responses to CQ Shocks under Di¤erent Policy Rules
3.3.3 Volatility Analysis
Following the analysis of the impulse responses to two di¤erent exogenous shocks, we
rst compare the real and nancial statistics in the data and the model. Our aim is to
analyze the performance of the model by its ability to mimic the cyclical properties of
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real and nancial variables. In our analysis, we use HP-ltered (smoothing factor: 1600)
quarterly U.S. data for the period 1980-20108. To obtain the statistics in the model,
we simulate the model 500 times for 100 quarters, with the assumption that both
productivity and capital quality shocks a¤ect the model economy. We then compute
the business cycle statistics using the cyclical components of the HP-ltered series. In
Table 3.2, we report the relative standard deviations of real and nancial variables with
respect to output and their cross-correlations with output.
Table 3.2. Business Cycle Properties of Real and Financial Variables
Standard Deviation Correlation with GDP
Data Model Data Model
Consumption 0.69 0.68 0.93 0.78
Investment 3.74 3.92 0.94 0.93
Employment 0.84 0.34 0.74 0.54
Bank assets 1.34 1.81 0.31 0.94
Net Worth 7.08 13.50 0.44 0.69
Leverage Ratio 5.68 10.05 -0.13 -0.64
Spread 0.18 0.28 -0.59 -0.63
Examining the real and nancial statistics in the data, it can be seen that consump-
tion and employment are less volatile than output, while investment volatility is much
higher. In addition, consumption, investment and employment are highly pro-cyclical.
These are known as standard business cycle facts (King and Rebelo, 1999). Except the
spread, all nancial variables are more volatile than output. It can also be noticed that
bank assets and net worth are pro-cyclical, while the spread and the leverage ratio are
counter-cyclical. These business cycle properties of real and nancial variables broadly
match the data statistics found in Angeloni and Faia (2013) and Mimir (2013). The
8Data sources are presented in Appendix B.2 with details.
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pro-cyclicality of bank capital is also reported in these studies. On the other hand, Meh
and Moran (2010) and Rannenberg (2013) nd that bank net worth and bank capital
ratio are counter-cyclical, i.e., bank leverage is pro-cyclical.
We see that the model is able to reproduce the key business cycle facts in the U.S.
data and it is able to replicate most of the facts related to nancial variables. It nearly
matches the relative volatility of consumption and produces pro-cyclical real variables
as in the data. However, it underestimates the employment statistics9. In addition,
net worth and leverage ratio have relatively high volatilities in the model. The higher
volatility of bank net worth and leverage ratio within the model is as a result of the
direct e¤ect of the changes in asset prices on banksnet worth and leverage. Since
the uctuations in asset prices have a direct and pro-cyclical e¤ect on bank net worth,
bank capital is also pro-cyclical. Moreover, when output declines, the greater decrease
in bank capital indicates a signicant rise in bank leverage, which results in a highly
counter-cyclical leverage ratio.
In this section, we also study each macroprudential policy tools impact on the
volatilities of di¤erent macroeconomic variables. In doing so, we employ the method-
ology used in obtaining the model statistics reported in Table 3.2. Our results are
presented in Table 3.3.
9We believe that the performance of the model would improve with the introduction of wage stick-
iness. Moreover, the relative volatility of employment depends on the preference parameter, %, in the
utility function. A higher value of % implies a higher relative volatility.
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Table 3.3. Volatilities under Di¤erent Policy Rules: Standard Deviations(%)
Taylor Rule Taylor + RR Taylor + CR Taylor + RP
Real Variables
Output 1.37 1.15 1.03 1.23
Consumption 0.93 1.15 1.33 1.02
Investment 5.36 3.68 2.90 4.09
Employment 0.46 0.38 0.52 0.36
Financial Variables
Net Worth 18.47 12.60 14.55 16.30
Spread 0.38 0.28 0.19 0.25
Asset Prices 3.59 2.90 2.30 3.02
Monetary & Macroprudential Variables
Ination 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
Interest Rate 0.13 0.16 0.24 0.12
Macropru. Tool - 6.43 5.71 6.58
To start with, we examine the di¤erences in the volatilities of certain real variables.
It can be mentioned that all three macroprudential tools are e¤ective in decreasing
output volatility, while the adoption of these tools increases the volatility of consump-
tion. The lowest volatility of output and investment are obtained under the capital
requirements. When we analyze the volatility of the nancial variables, it can be seen
that all three macroprudential alternatives are e¤ective in decreasing the volatility of
net worth, the spread and asset prices. The lowest volatility of the spread and asset
prices are also obtained in the presence of capital requirements. When ination stabil-
ity is the main concern, it can be suggested that there is no trade-o¤ between the use
of alternative macroprudential tools. Since all three macroprudential tools respond to
the uctuations in total nominal credit, the order of the volatilities of asset prices is
83
reected in the order of the volatilities of these tools.
3.3.4 Macroprudential Policies and Welfare
Following Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), we begin our
welfare analysis by writing the households utility function recursively,
 t = Ut(Ct; Ct 1;Lt) + Et t+1 (3.42)
We then take a second order approximation of  t around the steady state, under each
policy alternative. Using the second order solution of the model, we compute the value
of  t, which corresponds to the welfare loss under each alternative. In this computation,
we use the values of the monetary and macroprudential policy parameters (; y; rr; cr
and rp) that optimize  t in response to productivity or nancial shocks.
10 By taking
the di¤erence of the values of  t obtained under the monetary policy rule only and
each macroprudential policy alternative, we can nd the welfare gains from using each
macroprudential tool. To convert these gains to consumption equivalents (CEs), we
then compute the fraction of the steady state consumption required to equate welfare
under the monetary policy rule, to the one under each macroprudential alternative. In
Table 3.4, we present the optimized values for the policy parameters and the welfare
gain obtained under each macroprudential alternative in terms of the CE. Under both
shocks, we nd that the optimal parameter for the output gap in the Taylor Rule is
equal to zero, as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). As a result, in our analysis we
set this parameter equal to zero and nd the optimal parameters for ination and total
10Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) provide a detailed discussion on the calculation of the welfare
loss in New Keynesian DSGE models.
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nominal credit in the monetary and macroprudential policy rules, respectively.
Table 3.4. Optimal Parameters & Welfare Gains under Di¤erent Policy Rules
In response to TFP shocks In response to nancial shocks
CE Optimal Parameters CE Optimal Parameters
(%)  rr=cr=rp (%)  rr=cr=rp
Taylor (TR) - 3.82 - - 5.00 -
TR + RR 0.0019 5.00 1.26 0.0003 5.00 0.21
TR + CR 0.0429 5.00 1.40 0.1867 4.89 0.96
TR + RP 0.0001 3.82 0.00 0.0034 5.00 1.87
Table 3.4 shows that the degree of the counter-cyclicality of each macroprudential
tool depends on the origin of the shock a¤ecting the economy. However, the adoption of
all macroprudential policies results in a decrease in the welfare loss when the economy
experiences a TFP or a nancial shock. The least e¤ective macroprudential policy tool
is the regulation premium under the TFP shock, while it is the reserve requirements un-
der the nancial shock. It should be noted that under each shock, the macroprudential
tool that has the smallest positive e¤ect on welfare is the one with an optimized macro-
prudential policy parameter that is closer to zero. When the economy experiences a
TFP shock, macroprudential policies improve welfare, but the change is quantitatively
small. Under the nancial shock, the utilization of the capital requirements and the
regulation premium has a higher positive e¤ect on welfare.
It is important to notice that the use of capital requirements has the highest positive
e¤ect on welfare irrespective of the type of the shock a¤ecting the economy. This
nding is in line with the impulse responses presented in Section 3.3.2, where it is
seen that counter-cyclical capital requirements are the most e¤ective macroprudential
tool in mitigating the negative e¤ects of both shocks to the spread, asset prices and
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investment. As previously mentioned, the nancial accelerator mechanism used in
our model features a pecuniary externality, where bankers do not consider the fact
that if they issued more equity, they would decrease the risk of the banking sector.
Consequently, they accumulate high levels of leverage, which amplies the negative
e¤ects of exogenous shocks to the economy and results in a decline in welfare. Since
capital requirements directly target banksleverage (or capital ratio), it is not counter-
intuitive to nd that they are the most e¤ective macroprudential tool in mitigating the
negative e¤ects of the nancial accelerator mechanism.
Before concluding our welfare analysis, we also consider the scenario where both
monetary and macroprudential policy instruments respond to the uctuations in the
total nominal credit in the economy. In this case, the optimized values for the policy
parameters and the value of the CE obtained under each macroprudential alternative
are reported in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 Optimal Parameters & Welfare Gains with Credit Growth in the TR
In response to TFP shocks In response to nancial shocks
CE Optimal Parameters CE Optimal Parameters
(%)  QS rr=cr=rp (%)  QS rr=cr=rp
TR + RR 0.0019 5.00 0.00 1.26 0.0006 5.00 0.01 0.19
TR + CR 0.0429 5.00 0.00 1.40 0.1867 4.98 0.00 0.96
TR + RP 0.0001 3.82 0.00 0.00 0.0036 5.00 0.01 1.80
Under nancial shocks, there are little welfare gains from including nancial market
developments in the Taylor rule, when the reserve requirements or the regulation pre-
mium are already in place. The optimized coe¢ cient for the total nominal credit in the
monetary policy rule is close to zero. In the presence of capital requirements, which are
86
the most e¤ective macroprudential tool in mitigating the negative e¤ects of the nan-
cial accelerator mechanism, the monetary authority cannot generate additional welfare
gains by responding to the uctuations in the total nominal credit. When the economy
experiences a productivity shock and one of the aforementioned macroprudential tools
is in place, the optimal coe¢ cient of the total nominal credit in the Taylor rule is equal
to zero. As a result, we conclude that our analysis suggests the use of two di¤erent
policy instruments, to achieve two distinct but related objectives, namely nancial and
macroeconomic stability.
In our welfare analysis, we have assumed that the use of the interest rate and the
macroprudential tools is assigned to the central bank, or put di¤erently, the monetary
and the macroprudential authorities cooperate. In case of non-cooperation, each au-
thority would minimize its own loss function, taking the others policy rule as given.
In this case, we would need to use an exogenously determined loss function for each
authority11.
3.3.5 Robustness Checks
When presenting the welfare gains obtained under the three macroprudential policies (as
in Table 3.4), we use the values given in our baseline calibration. To check the robustness
of our results, we re-calculate the welfare gains obtained under each macroprudential
policy, changing the values of di¤erent parameters. Table 3.6 reports the ordering of
macroprudential policies according to their welfare gains when the low, baseline or the
high value for a parameter is used. We display our results for the case where the econ-
11See Angelini et. al (2011) for a discussion on the topic.
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Table 3.6. Ordering of Macroprudential Policies for Di¤erent Parameter Values
Low Baseline High
 = 2  = 4  = 6
 CR>RP=RR CR>RP>RR CR>RP>RR
 = 0:60  = 0:75  = 0:90
 CR>RP>RR CR>RP>RR CR>RP>RR
 = 0:4  = 0:7  = 0:9
 CR>RP=RR CR>RP>RR CR>RR>RP
X= 1 X= 2 X= 4
X CR>RP>RR CR>RP>RR CR>RP>RR
 = 0:60  = 0:75  = 0:90
 CR>RR>RP CR>RP>RR CR>RR>RP
Note: RR = reserve requirements, CR = capital requirements, RP = regulation
premium.
omy is a¤ected by a negative capital quality shock. The parameters that we include
in our robustness analysis are: bank leverage at the steady state (), degree of price
stickiness (), habit persistence (), degree of investment adjustment costs (X) and
persistence of the capital quality shock ( ).
As with the baseline calibration, use of the regulation premium results in higher wel-
fare gains than the utilization of reserve requirements under most of the calibrations.
The exceptions to this result are present for high values of  and  . Moreover, for
low values of the steady state leverage ratio and habit persistence, use of both of these
policies does not result in any welfare gains. Hence, their ordering is the same. On the
other hand, utilization of capital requirements generates the highest welfare gains under
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all the parameter values considered. As a result, the nding that the capital require-
ments are the most e¤ective macroprudential tool in mitigating the negative e¤ects of
the nancial accelerator mechanism, is robust to di¤erent parameter specications.
3.4 Conclusions
In this paper, utilizing a New Keynesian DSGE model with nancial frictions à la
Gertler and Karadi (2011), we present a comparative analysis of three macroprudential
policy tools; reserve requirements, capital requirements and a regulation premium. Our
analysis is motivated by the lack of studies in the macroprudential policy literature that
make a comparison of alternative policies, using a unied framework.
Running a number of simulations, we nd that all of the aforementioned macro-
prudential tools are successful in lowering the negative e¤ects of exogenous shocks to
the economy. They do so by mitigating the negative e¤ects of the nancial accelera-
tor mechanism, which is triggered by the decrease in asset prices. As a result of this
decrease, banks experience a downturn in their balance sheets, which increases their
leverage ratios and raises the spread. The rise in the spread increases the cost of capital,
which results in a further decline in investment and asset prices. Finally, the decline
in investment lowers the aggregate output. Irrespective of the source of the decline
in economic activity, capital requirements are the most e¤ective macroprudential tool
in lowering the negative e¤ects of the given shocks to the spread, asset prices and in-
vestment. As a result, they perform the best in mitigating the negative e¤ects of the
nancial accelerator mechanism built in banksbalance sheet constraints.
Computing the welfare loss and the corresponding consumption equivalent under
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each policy alternative, we can also identify the macroprudential tool that generates the
highest positive e¤ect on welfare. Examining the case where the economy experiences a
productivity or a nancial shock only, we nd that all three macroprudential policies are
successful in decreasing the welfare loss. Consistent with the results of the simulations,
use of capital requirements generates the highest welfare gains, under each shock.
90
Chapter 4
Evaluating the Net Benets of
Unconventional Policies
4.1 Introduction
The recent global nancial crisis is regarded by many economists as the worst since
the Great Depression. In a large number of countries, central banks and governments
have used a variety of unconventional policy measures to mitigate its adverse e¤ects.
Central banks have mainly provided liquidity to the economy as a whole. Governments
have assisted central banks with the implementation of programs that provide direct
support to nancial institutions.
As a prominent example, the Fed in the U.S. has used a variety of policy tools
to provide direct support to credit markets and hence to the economy. These can be
classied into three sets. The rst set of tools, which fall under the central banks
role as the lender of last resort, include the provision of short-term liquidity to nancial
institutions. The second set, referred to as credit easing, involves the supply of liquidity
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directly to borrowers and investors in the nancial markets. As part of these, the Fed has
introduced facilities to purchase highly rated commercial paper and to provide liquidity
for money market mutual funds. The nal set of tools includes the purchase of longer-
term securities1. The U.S. Treasury, on the other hand, has used direct support to
banks under its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as its main policy instrument.
Even though the Treasury has rst considered buying troubled assets, through TARP,
their main support has refocused on injecting equity to nancial institutions, using the
Capital Purchase Program (CPP) included in TARP (Contessi and El-Ghazaly, 2011).
Most of these programs are often justied by the aim of reducing the fall in lending
and recapitalizing nancial institutions. In this way, they are expected to relax the
constraints in nancial markets and restore their functioning. However, taxpayers are
concerned about the costs of the support programs, which might more than o¤set the
benets and in the end, lead to higher taxes. Economists are worried about the e¤ects
of these programs on increasing moral hazard problems. Hence, the debate among
economists and policy makers on the optimal policy response to nancial crises is still
ongoing.
In this paper, motivated by the lack of studies that focus on the scal implications
of unconventional policies, we present a comprehensive assessment of credit easing and
bank capital injections. Our study is related to two strands of the literature. The rst
includes the recent works that examine the e¤ects of capital purchase or lending by the
central bank. Gertler and Karadi (2011) construct a model where banks are nancially
constrained due to credit market frictions. Unlike nancial intermediaries, the monetary
authority does not face any constraints. Hence, during a crisis direct lending by the
1http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm
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central bank to private sector can be benecial. Examining various unconventional
monetary policies, Curdia and Woodford (2010) arrive at similar conclusions regarding
credit easing by the central bank. Del Negro et al (2010) also explore the outcomes
of government purchase of private assets in a DSGE model that contains nancial
frictions à la Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). They nd that the policy intervention eases
the constraints in the nancial markets, which in turn reduces the decline in investment
and consumption. The positive e¤ect of this unconventional policy can be substantial.
The second strand contains the studies that analyze the implications of bank capital
injections. Using an estimated New Keynesian model with a global bank, Kollmann
et al (2012) study the e¤ects of various scal stimulus packages employed in Europe.
They formulate the government support to banks as a public transfer. Their results
suggest that this type of policy has a stabilizing e¤ect on output, investment and
consumption. Hirakata et al (2013) also examine the use of bank capital injections, in
addition to spread-adjusted Taylor rules. The model that they use contains the nancial
accelerator mechanism developed by Bernanke et al (1999). They nd similar results
regarding the government support to banks.
We distinguish our paper from the aforementioned studies in two aspects. First, in
contrast to the given studies that examine the e¤ects of using unconventional monetary
or scal policies one at a time, we include both measures in our study and conduct a
comparison of the two. More importantly, we examine the costs, as well as the bene-
ts, of utilizing these credit policies. Since the returns and the costs from the use of
unconventional policies are both reected in the governments budget constraint, scal
policy tools need to adjust to the net gains/losses. To examine the use of alternative
scal instruments to respond to these changes in the scal balance, we add two sep-
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arate distortionary taxes to our analysis. These are consumption and labour income
taxes. As a result, we can analyze the scal implications of alternative unconventional
policy measures under di¤erent scenarios. We include three scenarios in our analysis:
(i) the government adopts lump-sum taxes and uses government spending to adjust to
the changes in the governments budget constraint, (ii) the government adopts distor-
tionary (consumption or labour income) taxes and uses the tax rate to respond to the
changes in its budget and nally (iii) the government adopts distortionary taxes and
uses government spending as its variable scal instrument. Unlike our paper, the afore-
mentioned studies that analyze the positive e¤ects of using credit policies only include
lump-sum taxes. We also use distortionary taxation in our analysis for another reason.
It enables us to bring our experiments closer to the experience of policy makers, that
mainly raise their revenues through distortionary taxes. Lump-sum taxes are rarely
used by scal authorities in practice. The main rationale behind this method is the
governments ine¢ ciency in observing the di¤erences among taxpayersability. Since
actual governments cannot observe ability, models with lump-sum taxes do not suggest
useful and realistic prescriptions (Mankiw et al, 2009).
To carry out our analysis, we build a New Keynesian DSGE model where the fric-
tions in the nancial intermediation process are as described in Gertler and Karadi
(2011). These frictions create an inter-temporal distortion in the economy; the credit
spread, which is dened as the di¤erence between the gross return to risky assets and
the gross riskless return. We characterize credit easing in our model as a policy tool
where the central bank increases the total credit in the economy with the supply of loans
to non-nancial rms. Bank equity injections, on the other hand, directly increase the
capital of banks. We assume that the central bank or the government face e¢ ciency
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costs when one of the given policies is used.
The main nding in our paper is that when the economy experiences a nancial
shock, the use of both types of unconventional policy measures mitigates its negative
e¤ects. The nancial shock results in a decrease in asset prices, which triggers the
nancial accelerator mechanism. As a result of this decrease, banks experience a down-
turn in their balance sheets, that increases their leverage ratios and hence, the credit
spread. The rise in the spread increases the cost of capital, which in turn, decreases
investment and asset prices further. Finally, the fall in investment lowers the aggregate
output. When the central bank pursues credit easing or the government injects capital
into banks, the increase in the credit spread is lowered. As a result, the rise in the cost
of capital dampens. With the use of both credit policies, the lower increase in the cost
of capital corresponds to a smaller decrease in investment and hence, aggregate output.
Since bank capital injections result in a direct increase in banksnet worth, they induce
a much lower increase in the leverage ratio and the spread compared to credit easing.
Consequently, their positive e¤ect on investment and aggregate output is higher. When
credit easing is used, the central bank can utilize the excess return on assets present in
times of the nancial crisis. However, with bank capital injections, there are no excess
returns to equity, since the return to government equity is the same as the return to
government bonds. Hence, due to the e¢ ciency costs of credit policies, use of equity
injections causes an increase in scal costs, while utilization of credit easing results in
an increase in scal revenues. As a result, under scenarios (i) and (iii), use of credit
easing increases government spending, whereas bank capital injections cause a decrease
in the same variable. Under scenario (ii), there is a rise (decline) in the tax rates when
bank capital injections (credit easing) is used. However, use of bank capital injections
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still results in the lowest decrease in economic activity, under all three scenarios.
Since the benets and the costs from pursuing bank capital injections are both
higher than that of credit easing, it is important to analyze the welfare outcomes of
using these alternative credit policies. We compare the welfare implications of the
given policies under the same scenarios. Our welfare results show that when lump-
sum taxes rather than distortionary taxes are in place, use of credit policies generates
higher welfare gains, only when tax rates adjust to the changes in the scal balance.
However, when government spending is used to respond to the changes in governments
budget, the presence of distortionary taxes does not result in a decrease in welfare.
Even though the use of variable tax rates cause a decrease in welfare, the utilization
of unconventional policies still generates welfare gains. In addition, use of bank capital
injections results in the highest welfare gains, regardless of the governments approach
to raising scal revenues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes our model by
presenting a detailed explanation of the economic agents, including the central bank,
the government and the unconventional policies that they can use. Section 4.3 presents
our quantitative results. The impulse responses to a nancial shock are elaborated with
the use of bank capital injections and/or credit easing, under three di¤erent scenarios
regarding the governments approach to raising scal revenues. The presentation of the
welfare implications of pursuing credit policies under these scenarios follows the impulse
responses. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes.
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4.2 The Economy
Our framework is a New Keynesian DSGE model that contains a credit market and
goods markets. The model economy includes seven type of agents: households that
consist of bankers and workers, banks, capital goods producers, wholesale rms, re-
tail rms, the scal and the monetary authority. We now continue with a detailed
exploration of the economic agents in the economy.
4.2.1 Banks
The setting for the banking sector in our model follows that in Gertler and Karadi
(2011). Bankers intermediate assets between households and wholesale rms. A rep-
resentative bank supplies loans to non-nancial rms, using the deposits acquired from
households and its own net worth, which is given by the accumulation of past bank
prots. Accordingly, the banks balance sheet is given by,
Qtst = nt + dt (4.1)
where st denotes loans to non-nancial rms, Qt their price, nt net worth and dt
deposits.
The banks balance sheet implies an accumulation of net worth according to
nt = Rk;tQt 1st 1  Rtdt 1
= Rtnt 1 + (Rk;t  Rt)Qt 1st 1 (4.2)
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where Rt is the gross risk-free return to deposits and Rk;t denotes the gross risky
return to banks assets. Net worth at the end of period t is equal to the gross riskless
return plus the excess return on banks assets.
The friction in the nancial sector is based on a principal-agent problem between
the banks and the households. After a bank obtains funds, the bankers manager may
transfer a fraction,  of total assets for her own benet. In such a case, the creditors can
force the bank to default on its debt and reclaim the remaining 1- fraction of funds.
As households are aware of this possibility, they limit the funds that they supply to
banks.
To exclude the case where bankers accumulate su¢ cient net worth that makes their
nancial constraints not binding, we assume that with probability 1-, a banker exits
and becomes a worker. In addition, the same number of workers randomly become
bankers. Only upon exiting the bank pays dividends. As a result, the bankers objective
at the end of period t is to maximize expected discounted terminal net worth,
Vt = Et
1X
i=1
(1  )i 1t;t+int+i (4.3)
Given nt 1 at the beginning of period t, net worth in period t is given by the choice
of fst+ig.
Since households know that the banker may transfer a fraction of total assets, they
are willing to supply deposits to banks only if the following nancial constraint is
satised,
Vt  Qtst
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The constraint shows that for depositors to be eager to lend to banks, the bankers
loss from diverting funds should be at least as large as her gain from diverting. As a
result, the bankers objective is to maximize Vt subject to the given incentive constraint.
We solve the bankers optimization problem using backward induction. Hence, we
start by guessing that Vt can be expressed in the following form,
Vt = Vt(st; dt) = vs;tst   vd;tdt (4.4)
Eliminating dt from Equation (4.4) using the bank balance sheet, we can obtain,
Vt = Vt(st; nt) = s;tQtst + vd;tnt (4.5)
Here, vs;t and vd;t are time-varying marginal values of loans and deposits, respectively
and s;t =
vs;t
Qt
  vd;t is the excess value of the banks assets over its deposits.
Maximization of Vt(st; nt) subject to the incentive constraint results in the following
optimality conditions,
(1 + t)s;t = t
s;tQtst + vd;tnt  Qtst
Dening t as the leverage ratio, the maximum ratio of a banks assets to its net
worth that satises the incentive constraint, we obtain
Qtst = tnt (4.6)
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where t =
vd;t
  s;t
:
It can be seen that the leverage ratio of the bank is an increasing function of the
excess marginal value of loans, s;t and a decreasing function of the fraction of assets
that can be diverted by the banker, . An increase in s;t increases the franchise value
of the bank, reducing the bankers incentive to divert funds and making depositors more
willing to lend to the bank. As result, the bank can increase the supply of its loans,
and hence, its leverage ratio. In contrast, a rise in  causes an increase in the bankers
incentive, reducing the deposits supplied to the bank.
Using Equations (4.5) and (4.6) to rewrite Equation (4.3) gives,
Vt(st; nt) = Ett;t+1

(1  ) + (s;t+1t+1 + vd;t+1)

nt+1
 Ett;t+1t+1nt+1
 Ett;t+1t+1 [Rk;t+1Qtst  Rt+1dt]
Finally, comparing the above equation with our initial guess, we obtain vs;t, vd;t and
s;t as
vs;t = Ett;t+1t+1Rk;t+1Qt
vd;t = Ett;t+1t+1Rt+1
s;t = Ett;t+1t+1 (Rk;t+1  Rt+1)
where t = (1  ) + (s;tt + vd;t) is the shadow value of a unit of net worth.
The di¤erence between the gross return to loans, Rk;t and the gross riskless return, Rt
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is dened as the spread. The spread is the inter-temporal distortion created by the
existence of nancial frictions in the banking sector. In a model with no credit market
frictions, we would have Et [Rt+1] = Et [Rk;t+1].
As the components of t are not dependent on bank specic factors, we can sum
across individual banks to obtain the aggregate banking sector balance sheet,
QtSt = tNt (4.7)
The accumulation of aggregate net worth is given by the sum of the net worth of
surviving bankers (No;t) and of new entrants (Ne;t).
Net worth of surviving bankers equals earnings on assets net debt payments from
the previous period, multiplied by the portion that survive (),
No;t = (Rk;tQt 1St 1  RtDt 1) (4.8)
while net worth of the new entrants is obtained with the assumption that the ratio
"
1   of the total value of the exiting bankersassets are transferred to new bankers,
Ne;t = "(Rk;tQt 1St 1) (4.9)
Hence, the accumulation of net worth at the aggregate level is obtained as
Nt = Rk;t ( + ")Qt 1St 1   RtDt 1 (4.10)
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4.2.2 Unconventional Policies
During the global nancial crisis, various central banks have employed di¤erent credit
policies to cope with the downturn in their economies. In the U.S., the Fed and the
Treasury (acting in coordination with the Fed) have pursued two main policy actions,
which are credit easing and bank equity injections. In the following subsections, we use
the above set out framework to analyze the working mechanism of these policies.
Credit Easing (CE)
As explained in Fed president Bernankes speech on February 18, 2009, the use of con-
ventional monetary policies, that work through inuencing short-term interest rates,
has not been su¢ cient to mitigate the negative e¤ects of the global nancial crisis on
credit conditions. Hence, central banks have utilized unconventional policy measures
to enhance the functioning of nancial markets and to increase the supply of credit to
non-nancial rms. Although central banks have rst provided liquidity to nancial in-
stitutions, continued credit risk limited the willingness of many nancial intermediaries
to use this extra liquidity to extend credit. As a result, central banks have directly
supplied credit to businesses, to reduce spreads, and in turn improve asset prices and
the ow of funds in the economy.2
The Federal Reserve has established several lending programmes to provide liquidity
to credit markets during the global nancial crisis. It has formed the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility (CPFF) to improve the market for high-quality commercial paper.
Similar to the Fed, the Bank of England (BoE) operated the Asset Purchase Facility
2http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090218a.htm
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(APF), which included private asset purchases to relax credit market conditions and
more traditional QE. Within this facility, the BoE purchased 3 billion pounds of private
assets. During the current crisis, the Bank of Japan has also announced purchases of 3
trillion yens in commercial paper. The purchases in all three countries have increased
asset prices, resulting in an increase in the number of buyers and the resumption of
trade (Fawley and Neely, 2013).
To model this type of unconventional policy, referred to as credit easing, we follow
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and assume that the central bank can directly supply private
securities (loans) to non-nancial rms at the market lending rate, Rk;t+1. To nance
this action, it issues government bonds that are perfect substitutes for bank deposits
and that pay the gross riskless return, Rt+1. Households know that the central bank
would not default on its debt. As a result, unlike private nancial intermediaries, the
central bank is not balance sheet constrained and it can utilize the excess return on
assets in times of nancial distress. However, it faces an e¢ ciency cost,  s, per unit of
credit supplied to the market.
In case of credit easing, loans to non-nancial rms at the aggregate level are now
given by the sum of privately intermediated securities, Spt and the securities that are
intermediated via the central bank,Sgt ,
QtSt = Qt(S
p
t + S
g
t ) (4.11)
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that the securities intermediated by
the central bank are given by a fraction of total loans,
Sgt = 'tSt (4.12)
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Accordingly, Equation (4.7) must be rewritten as,
QtSt = tNt + 'tQtSt (4.13)
Equity Injections (BCI)
Another form of unconventional policy that can be used to limit the unfavorable conse-
quences of the nancial crisis is bank capital injections. The focus of this policy action
is the stabilization of the banking sector, by the improvement of its safety and sound-
ness through increased capitalization. Increasing lending during a nancial crisis forces
banks to raise the riskiness of their lending. Hence, government support to banks is
expected to ease the nancing of projects that private banks would not be willing to
nance otherwise, and increase the supply of credit (Black and Hazelwood, 2012).
During the global nancial crisis, the U.S. Treasury has used the Capital Purchase
Program (CPP) to inject equity into nancial institutions, similar to the arrangements
used by the Bank of Japan to stabilize Japanese banks in the 1990s. In total, 205
billion dollars of funds has been distributed to 707 institutions. The U.K. Treasury has
also injected about 50 billion pounds of equity into British banks (Mishkin, 2010). In
addition, bank capital injections had been widely used before the 2007-09 experience. As
mentioned by Contessi and El-Ghazaly (2011), governments had used equity injections
in 32 out of the 42 banking crises that have occurred between 1970 and 2007.
In line with this experience, we assume that the scal authority in our framework
can support the central bank by injecting equity into the banking sector and nance
these injections by issuance of government bonds. We maintain that a unit of equity
injected by the government, N gt has the same return as a unit of private equity, Nt,
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that is, the government does not pay a premium for bank equity. In addition, the
surviving bankers pay back the return to government equity the next period3. As given
in Equation (4.2), the return to a unit of private bank equity, Nt 1 is Rt. Accordingly,
in the presence of bank equity injections, Equation (4.10) needs to be rewritten as
Nt = Rk;t ( + ")Qt 1St 1   RtDt 1 +N gt   RtN gt 1 (4.14)
where the last two terms correspond to the increase in bank net worth with the
injection, net of repayments. Since the bank needs to repay the return on the capital
injected by the government, it takes time for bank net worth to rebuild and the exit
from the credit policy lasts long. As with credit easing, we maintain that government
equity is a fraction of total bank equity,
N gt = tNt (4.15)
and there are e¢ ciency costs relating to government equity injections, which are
given by N per unit of equity supplied.
4.2.3 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of members of measure unity.
The two types of members within the household are workers and bankers. Workers
supply labour and earn wages while bankers manage nancial intermediaries and trans-
fer dividends back to households. Households hold their savings as deposits, which are
assumed to be riskless one period securities.
3Even though very few of the Capital Purchase Program beneciaries have failed in the period
between 2008 and 2010, not all have survived. (Contessi and El-Ghazaly, 2011).
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A representative household maximizes expected discounted utility,
E0
1X
t=0
tUt(Ct; Ct 1;Lt) (4.16)
subject to the following budget constraint,
(1 + tct)Ct = (1  tht )Wtht + t +RtDt 1  Dt (4.17)
where 0<<1 is the subjective discount factor, E is the expectation operator, Ct
denotes consumption and Lt leisure, Wt the wage rate, ht(= 1  Lt) hours worked and
Dt bank deposits. In Equation (4.17) tct and t
h
t denote the consumption and the labour
income tax rate, respectively. t are the prots earned from the ownership of banks
and rms.
The households rst order conditions for the consumption Euler equation and
labour supply are given by,
1 = Rt+1Et

t;t+1
1 + tct
1 + tct+1

(4.18)
Uh;t
UC;t
=  UL;t
UC;t
=  Wt1  t
h
t
1 + tct
(4.19)
where Ut =
(Ct Ct 1)(1 %)(1 )(1 ht)%(1 ) 1
1  and t;t+1 = 
UC;t+1
UC;t
is the real stochastic
discount factor over the interval [t; t+ 1]. Examining the households rst order condi-
tions, we can observe the di¤erent distortions caused by the two tax instruments. The
labour income tax distorts the intra-temporal substitution between consumption and
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leisure. The current consumption tax distorts the same margin. Moreover, both the
current and next periods consumption tax enters into the current Euler equation4.
4.2.4 Wholesale Firms
Wholesale rms produce output, Y Wt , using a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
production function that contains labour and capital as factor inputs,
Y Wt = Y
W
t (At; ht;Kt 1) = (Atht)
K1 t 1 (4.20)
At denotes aggregate productivity, which follows an AR(1) process.
logAt   logA = A(logAt 1   logA) + "A
It should be noticed that Kt is the end-of-period t capital stock. Firms choose
labour to satisfy,
PWt
Pt
Y Wh;t = Wt (4.21)
PWt and Pt are the aggregate price indices in the wholesale and retail sectors, re-
spectively. Y Wh;t = 
YWt
ht
. Prot maximization by whole rms yields the given labour
demand equation, which indicates that the marginal product of labour should be equal
to the real wage. It also implies that labour demand increases with an increase in the
production or the price of the wholesale output, while it decreases with an increase in
wages.
4The optimamization problem of the household, in the presence of lump-sum rather than distor-
tionary taxes, is presented in Appendix C.1.
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A wholesale rm issues new securities to obtain funds from banks, which are then
used to buy new capital goods from capital producers. The number of claims issued
by the rm, St is equal to the number of units of capital needed, Kt and so are their
prices,
QtSt = QtKt (4.22)
Through perfect competition, wholesale rms earn zero prots and they fully pay
the return to capital to the banks,
Rk;t =  t
(1  ) PWt YWt
PtKt 1
+ (1  )Qt
Qt 1
(4.23)
The return to capital depends on the marginal product of capital and the change in
price of capital, net of depreciation, .
4.2.5 Capital Producers
At time t, capital producers convert It of raw output into (1  S (Xt)) It of new capital,
subject to investment costs, S (Xt) 5. Hence, capital accumulation is given by
Kt =  t+1 [(1  )Kt 1 + (1  S (Xt)) It] (4.24)
where Xt =
It
It 1
and  t denotes the shock to the quality of capital, which follows
an AR(1) process6,
5The functional form of the investment costs is given by S (Xt) = XX
2
t , as large investment
adjustment costs are needed to match the smoother investment responses observed in U.S. business
cycles.
6The shock also has an e¤ect on the evolution of bank net worth. Accordingly, Equation (4.10)
should be rewritten as Nt = Rk;t ( + ") tQt 1St 1   RtDt 1:
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log t =  (log t 1) + " 
The maximization of expected discounted prots by capital producers yields7
Qt (1  S (Xt) XtS 0 (Xt)) + Et

t;t+1Qt+1S
0 (Xt+1)X2t+1

= 1 (4.25)
a positive relationship between investment and asset prices. The given equation is
known as the Tobins (1969) Q relation.
4.2.6 Retail Firms
Retail rms produce a basket of di¤erentiated goods for consumption. The demand for
consumption is given by
Ct(f) =

Pt(f)
Pt
 
Ct (4.26)
In aggregate, demand for investment, government expenditures and hence the nal
/retail output has the same functional form as consumption,
Yt(f) =

Pt(f)
Pt
 
Yt (4.27)
where  is the elasticity of substitution and the aggregate price index, Pt is given
by Pt =
R 1
0
Pt (f)
1  df
1=(1 )
.
7A detailed explanation of the capital producers maximization problem is presented in Appendix
C.2.
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We assume that retail rms modify the wholesale output Y Wt at a cost of c. Hence,
the relationship between the retail and the wholesale sector is given by8,
Yt =
(1  c)Y Wt
t
where t =
R 1
0

Pt(f)
Pt
 
df is a measure of price dispersion across retail rms
which set their prices à la Calvo(1983). According to this type of price staggering, 1-
percent of rms changes their prices each period, with an individual rms probability
of adjusting its price in any given period being random. The typical rm adjusting its
price in period t maximizes its discounted nominal prots
Et
1X
k=0
k
t;t+kYt+k(f) [P
a
t (f)  Pt+kMCt+k] (4.28)
subject to Equation (4.27). Here, MCt is the real marginal cost, P at (f) is the
adjusted price and 
t;t+k = 
kUC;t+k=Pt+k
UC;t=Pt
is the nominal stochastic discount factor
over the period [t; t+ k] :The solution to the maximization problem is given by
Et
1X
k=0
k
t;t+kYt+k(f) [P
a
t (f)  Pt+kMCt+k] = 0 (4.29)
where  =
1
1  1

is the steady state mark-up. Equation (4.29) can be rewritten as
Et
1X
k=0
()kUC;t+k
 1
t;t+kYt+k

P at (f)
Pt
  t;t+kMCt+k

= 0 (4.30)
where t;t+k =
Pt+k
Pt
is k periods ahead ination and Pt+k(f) = P at (f) is the price
set at time t that remains the same with probability k.
8The derivation of the relationship between the retail and the wholesale sector is presented in
Appendix C.3.
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With the given price-setting mechanism, the evolution of the price index is obtained
as
P 1 t+1 = P
1 
t + (1  )
 
P at+1
1 
(4.31)
As shown by Benigno and Woodford (2005), equations (4.30) and (4.31) can be
written recursively dening variables Ft and Ht,
Ht   Et
h
 1t+1Ht+1
i
= YtUC;t (4.32)
Ft   Et
h
t+1Ft+1
i
= YtUC;tMCt (4.33)
 1t + (1  )

Ft
Ht
1 
= 1 (4.34)
Here, t+1 = t;t+1 and t is the gross ination rate. The ratio
Ft
Ht
is equal to
P at
Pt
which is the optimal relative price. These three equations represent the non-linear
Phillips Curve. Using (4.31) and the assumption that the distribution of prices among
the rms that do not adjust their prices is the same as the overall distribution in period
t, the relationship between price dispersion and ination is obtained in line with Benigno
and Woodford (2005) as follows,
t = 

tt 1 + (1  )

Ft
Ht
 
(4.35)
One should notice that the real marginal cost for the retail sector can be expressed
as
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MCt =
PWt
Pt
(4.36)
since PWt is the cost of purchasing the wholesale good.
4.2.7 Monetary Policy
The central bank sets the gross nominal interest rate, Rn;t in period t to pay out interest
in period t + 1. The following Fisher equation gives the relation between the nominal
and the real interest rate,
Rn;t 1 = RtEtt (4.37)
Monetary policy is conducted using a simple Taylor rule,
log

Rn;t
Rn

=  log

t


+ y log

Yt
Y

(4.38)
where the steady state nominal rate, ination and output are given by Rn,  and
Y , respectively.
As previously mentioned, securities intermediated by the central bank and capital
injected by the government are determined as a fraction of total loans and total bank
net worth, respectively. As presented in Equations (4.12) and (4.15), these fractions
are given by 't and t, and they respond to the deviations of the credit spread from
its steady state value,
't = ' [(Rk;t  Rt)  (Rk  R)]
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t =  [(Rk;t  Rt)  (Rk  R)]
4.2.8 Fiscal Policy
We assume that in normal times government spending, Gt, is nanced by tax revenues.
In other words, the government keeps a balanced budget and does not issue any bonds.
However, when the central bank and/or the government pursues credit policies in times
of a crisis, government bonds, Bgt 1, which are perfect substitutes for deposits, nance
total government intermediated assets, given by the sum of the fraction of loans inter-
mediated by the central bank, 't 1Qt 1St 1 and the fraction of bank capital injected by
the government, t 1Nt 1. In addition, the costs and the returns from the utilization
of credit policies should be accounted for in the governments budget constraint. Ac-
cordingly, total government expenditures are nanced by tax revenues, (net) issuance
of government bonds and net earnings from credit market interventions,
Gt + (1 + 
S)'tQtSt + (1 + 
N)tNt = Tt +Rk;t't 1Qt 1St 1
+Rtt 1Nt 1 +B
g
t  RtBgt 1 (4.39)
As can be seen in Equation (4.39), total government expenditures in period t consist
of government spending and costs incurred by the government for supplying loans and
injecting equity, (1 + S)'tQtSt + (1 + 
N)tNt. B
g
t denotes the bonds issued in period
t to nance the intermediation of assets in the given period. The government earns the
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gross risky return, Rk;t from the loans supplied and the gross return to net worth, Rt
from the equity injected in period t  1. The cost of these intermediations is the gross
riskless return, Rt that the government pays on B
g
t 1. Total government revenues also
include the earnings from tax collection, Tt. When the scal authority adopts lump-
sum taxation, Tt directly represents lump-sum taxes. When the government adopts
distortionary taxation, Tt is equal to earnings from consumption or labour income
taxes, tctCt and t
h
t htWt, respectively. Government spending follows an AR(1) process,
logGt   logG = G(logGt 1   logG) + "G
4.3 Financial Crisis Simulations and Policy Exper-
iments
In this section, we present a nancial crisis experiment to demonstrate how the model
may replicate some features of the recent crisis and how credit policies can be utilized
to mitigate its negative e¤ects. In our model, we postulate the negative capital quality
shock as the origin of the nancial crisis as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). This shock
a¤ects the quality of the nancial intermediariesassets. Since banks are leveraged, the
decline in the value of their assets results in an amplied decrease in their net worth.
In this way, we can broadly mimic the dynamics of the global nancial crisis. We begin
by calibrating the model and continue with elaborating the crisis experiment.
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4.3.1 Calibration
Table 4.1 presents the parameters used in the calibration of our model. We start our
calibration by setting the nancial parameters and set their values in line with Gertler
and Karadi (2011). We choose the value of  to ensure an average survival of 10 years for
bankers. The values of " and  are calibrated to match an economy-wide leverage ratio
of 4, which approximately captures the aggregate data and an average credit spread of
100 basis points per year, which takes the pre-2007 spreads between BAA corporate
versus government bonds as the reference. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), we choose
conventional values for the labour share,  and the elasticity of substitution between
goods, . The steady state depreciation rate , the habit parameter , and the price
rigidity parameter  are also set in line with the values used by Gertler and Karadi
(2011). The specic parameters in our model are  (in the utility function) and X (in
the investment cost function). The values for these parameters are set to roughly reect
the empirical literature. We include habit formation and investment adjustment costs
in our analysis, since empirical work has shown that such real frictions improve the
ability of macroeconomic models to explain the business cycles in the U.S. (Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2007). For calibrating the discount factor,  and the preference
parameter, %, we use typical U.S. observations of 0.35 for hours worked and 1.01 for the
gross interest rate. To conclude, we present the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule and the
values for the tax rates in Table 4.1. The steady state levels of the consumption and the
labour income tax rates are given by 18% and 10%, respectively. We use the pre-2007
average OECD value-added tax rate9 for determining the rst, while the pre-2007 av-
9http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#vat, last accessed in October, 2014.
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Table 4.1. Parameters
Households
 0.987 Discount factor
 0.7 Habit parameter
 2 Preference parameter
% 0.876 Preference parameter
Capital Producers
X 2 Coe¢ cient of adjustment costs
Wholesale Firms
 0.7 Labour share
 0.025 Depreciation rate
Retail Firms
 7 Elasticity of substitution
 0.75 Probability of keeping prices constant
Banks
 0.975 Probability that bankers survive
" 0.001 Proportional transfer to the new entrants
 0.410 Fraction of bank assets that can be diverted
Central Bank
 1.5 Ination coe¢ cient of the Taylor rule
y 0.5/4 Output gap coe¢ cient of the Taylor rule
Government
tc 0.18 Steady state consumption tax rate
th 0.10 Steady state labour income tax rate
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erage labour income tax rate in the U.S.10 is used as a basis to set the second.
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that the e¢ ciency costs of credit policies
are equal to 10 basis points, S = tN = 0:0010. In addition, we set the persistence
parameters for all the shock processes in our model to 0.75, following the conventional
business cycle literature. Before concluding the quantitative analysis in our paper, we
check the robustness of our results to the changes in the calibration of key parameters.
4.3.2 Financial Crisis Experiment
We now present the nancial crisis experiment. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), we
assume that the nancial crisis is triggered by a negative shock to capital quality.
This shock decreases the quality of the nancial intermediariesassets and causes an
amplied decrease in their net worth, due to high leverage. We believe that we can
principally obtain the dynamics of the mortgage crisis, using such a shock. We analyze
the behaviour of certain macroeconomic variables under four di¤erent policy responses.
First, we look at the case where only the monetary policy rule is used by the central
bank. Then, we examine the behaviour of these variables when one of the credit policies
is in place. Finally, we consider the case where the funds obtained by the issuance of
government bonds are divided equally between the use of bank capital injections and
credit easing. We assume that the total gross scal costs of credit policies to the
government amount to 10% of the steady-state output11. However, the net costs of
10http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=456, last accessed in October,
2014.
11Contessi and El-Ghazaly (2011) estimate the gross scal cost of bank recapitalizations used during
the global nancial crisis to be equal to ($700 billion) 5% of GDP for the U.S. The Commercial Paper
Funding Facility established by the Fed during the recent crisis has lent out roughly the same amount
before it was closed. Hence, adding up the two results in the gross scal costs of credit policies to be
equal to 10% of GDP for the U.S.
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the two policies di¤er since the returns from the use of each credit policy are di¤erent.
As we would like to compare these net costs under di¤erent scenarios, we analyze the
model dynamics with the assumption that the scal authority can collect taxes using
three alternatives; lump-sum, consumption or labour income taxes.
Policy Responses with Lump-sum Taxes
First, we use the benchmark scenario to analyze the impulse responses to a negative one
percent change in capital quality under di¤erent credit policies. Under this scenario, we
assume that the scal authority adopts lump-sum taxation. Hence, use of government
spending or taxes to accommodate the changes in the scal balance has the same
implications. Figure 4.1 presents the dynamics under the benchmark scenario, where
government spending responds to the changes in the government budget constraint
caused by the use of unconventional policies. The shock to capital quality causes a
decline in banksnet worth. It also results in a reduction in asset prices, that triggers
the nancial accelerator mechanism. Since banks are leveraged, the decrease in asset
prices results in a decrease in net worth, that is multiplied by a factor equal to the
leverage ratio. As a result, banks experience a downturn in their balance sheets that
increases the leverage ratio. This deterioration makes it more di¢ cult for banks to
obtain funds from households. Hence, it causes a decrease in the supply of credit and
a rise in the spread, which in turn increases the cost of capital. As a result, demand
for capital decreases resulting in a further decline in investment and asset prices. The
overall decline in investment, in turn, decreases aggregate output. The decrease in
aggregate output depresses labour demand, marginal cost and hence, ination. The
monetary authority lowers the interest rate in response to the decrease in ination and
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Figure 4.1. Impulse Responses to Financial Shocks with Di¤erent Credit Policies
Benchmark Scenario*
*The solid red line denotes the case where only the monetary policy rule is used by the
central bank. The dashed blue line shows the use of bank capital injections with the monetary
policy rule. The dashed dotted black line presents the use of credit easing with the monetary
policy rule. Finally, the green line corresponds to the case where the funds obtained by the
issuance of government bonds are divided equally between the use of bank capital injections
and credit easing.
119
output. Finally, the overall decline in aggregate output is also reected in the
reduction in aggregate consumption. The use of credit policies by the central bank
and/or the government signicantly mitigates the negative e¤ects of the nancial shock.
The main reason behind this positive outcome is the credit policiesability to dampen
the increase in the spread. As a result, the increase in the cost of capital, the decline
in investment, and in turn, the decrease in aggregate output are lowered. When the
central bank pursues credit easing, the supply of credit to non-nancial rms increases
and the increase in the spread is lowered. As a result, rms are a¤ected less from
the disruption in the nancial markets caused by the deterioration in banksbalance
sheets. In case of bank capital injections, the government injects the funds obtained
to banks, which directly results in a signicant increase in banksnet worth. Hence,
the rise in the leverage ratio dampens and bankers nd it easier to acquire funds from
depositors. This results in an increase in the supply of credit and an important decline
in the increase in the spread. It can be seen that the positive e¤ect of pursuing bank
capital injections on aggregate output is higher, as it results in a much lower increase
in the spread compared to credit easing.
However, as previously mentioned, the exit from the capital injections takes much
longer. Hence, the bonds issued by the government remain well above the steady-state
level for a longer period. In the absence of unconventional policies, the government
keeps a balanced budget and government spending stays constant. When bank capital
injections are used, the government needs to decrease its spending. With the assumption
that a unit of equity injected by the government has the same payout rule as a unit
of private equity, the return to bank capital injections exactly o¤sets the cost from
the issuance of government bonds. As a result, the government earns zero prots from
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bank capital injections and their e¢ ciency costs need to be nanced with a decrease
in government spending. On the other hand, when credit easing is used by the central
bank, the net earnings from the utilization of this credit policy, (Rk;t Rt)'t 1Qt 1St 1
are higher than the e¢ ciency costs. Consequently, government spending increases.
In other words, use of bank capital injections causes a net increase in government
expenditures, while utilization of credit easing results in a net increase in government
revenues. Looking at the three alternative cases, it can be seen that the equal division
of funds between the use of capital injections and credit easing results in a case where
both the benets and the costs from pursuing these policies stay in between those of
using only one of the policies.
Policy Responses with Distortionary Taxation
Since the gains and losses from the credit market interventions pursued changes the
governments budget constraint, using distortionary taxation in our analysis enables us
to conduct a more detailed comparison of alternative credit policies. Hence, we present
the impulse responses to a negative one percent change in capital quality under di¤er-
ent credit policies, with the assumption that the scal authority adopts consumption or
labour income taxes. Under each case, the government can either use government spend-
ing or tax rates to respond to the changes in its budget constraint. When distortionary
taxes are in place, use of alternative scal instruments has di¤erent implications.
Consumption Taxes
In Figure 4.2, we present the impulse responses to a unit decrease in capital quality,
when the government adopts consumption taxes and government spending accommo-
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dates the changes in the scal balance. Since consumption decreases and the consump-
tion tax rate stays constant, government spending also decreases under all policy
alternatives. Moreover, the dynamics of government spending closely follows that of
Figure 4.2. Impulse Responses to Financial Shocks with Di¤erent Credit Policies
Consumption Taxes & Use of Government Spending
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consumption. The decrease in the spending is higher under bank capital injections,
while it is lower under credit easing, compared to the case with no credit intervention.
This di¤erence is mainly due to the aforementioned di¤erences in the returns to bank
capital injections and credit easing. Under each policy alternative, the decrease in
government spending caused by the use of consumption taxes results in a higher decrease
in aggregate output, compared to the benchmark scenario.
In Figure 4.3, impulse responses to the same shock are presented with the assump-
tion that the scal authority adopts consumption taxes and the tax rate is used to
accommodate the changes in the government budget constraint. The tax rate increases
under all policies due to the decrease in consumption. Compared to the case with no
credit policy, use of bank capital injections mainly results in an increase in the tax
rate, while the utilization of credit easing slightly causes a decrease. When consump-
tion taxes adjust to the changes in the scal authoritys budget, instead of government
spending, the decrease in the level of consumption is higher. In addition, under all pol-
icy alternatives, the decrease in aggregate output is higher, compared to the benchmark
scenario.
Labour Income Taxes
Figure 4.4 presents the impulse responses to a unit decrease in capital quality, when
the government adopts labour income taxes and government spending accommodates
the changes in the scal balance. As the tax rate stays constant, the decrease in the
labour income due to lower wages and hours worked results in a decrease in government
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Figure 4.3. Impulse Responses to Financial Shocks with Di¤erent Credit Policies
Consumption Taxes & Use of Tax Rate
spending under all policy alternatives. As in Figure 4.2, government spending with
bank capital injections is mainly lower than the spending under credit easing, as a
result of the higher returns to credit easing. Compared to the benchmark scenario,
the decrease in the level of aggregate output is higher under each policy alternative, as
government spending decreases with the use of labour income taxes.
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Figure 4.4. Impulse Responses to Financial Shocks with Di¤erent Credit Policies
Labour Income Taxes & Use of Government Spending
In Figure 4.5, impulse responses to the same shock are presented with the assump-
tion that the scal authority adopts labour income taxes and the tax rate is used to
accommodate the changes in the government budget constraint. With labour income
taxes, since bank capital injections result in a lower decline in aggregate output, and
hence, hours worked, the tax rate does not increase as much as it does under consump-
tion taxes. Still, it is mainly higher than the tax rate obtained with the use of credit
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easing. When labour income tax rates, rather than government spending, adjust to the
changes in the government budget constraint, the decrease in the level of hours worked
is higher. Moreover, under all policies, the decrease in aggregate output is higher than
the decline obtained with the benchmark scenario.
Figure 4.5. Impulse Responses to Financial Shocks with Di¤erent Credit Policies
Labour Income Taxes & Use of Tax Rate
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Most of the aggregate variables under consumption and labour income taxes have a
similar outlook, even though the tax/government spending proles in the two scenarios
are quite di¤erent. Compared with the benchmark scenario (that assumes lump-sum
taxation), existence of consumption taxes results in a decrease in the level of consump-
tion, while it does not cause a signicant change in the behaviour of hours worked. On
the other hand, in the presence of labour income taxes, the dynamics of both consump-
tion and hours worked are distorted. However, the decrease in the level of consumption
is lower than then the decline obtained under consumption taxes.
As previously mentioned, the di¤erence in the returns to bank capital injections and
credit easing results in a di¤erence in their contribution to the governments budget.
With the assumption that a unit of equity injected by the government has the same
payout rule as a unit of private equity, the costs from the issuance of government bonds
are equal to the returns to bank capital injections. As a result, the e¢ ciency costs
of bank capital injections need to be nanced with an increase in taxes (decrease in
government spending). On the contrary, the net earnings from credit easing are higher
than its e¢ ciency costs. Hence, use of credit easing results in a decrease in taxes
(increase in government spending). In Table 4.2, we aim to quantify the positive e¤ect
of the lower tax rates obtained with the use of credit easing in a simple manner. To
do so, we present the percentage increase in aggregate output obtained under each
unconventional policy alternative with the benchmark scenario (lump-sum taxes) and
variable tax rates. The steady-state level of lump-sum taxes in each benchmark scenario
is equal to the steady-state tax revenues obtained with the use consumption or labour
income taxes. The percentage increase in output under alternative unconventional
policies is given relative to the output obtained under no credit policy. The numbers
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are presented for the period with the lowest economic activity.
Table 4. 2. Relative Increase in Aggregate Ouput under Di¤erent Credit Policies (%)
Benchmark for Cons. Taxes Variable Cons. Tax Rates
BCI 34.77 29.62
CE 8.64 9.13
BCI+CE 14.51 14.66
Benchmark for Lab. Inc. Taxes Variable Labour Inc. Tax Rates
BCI 31.41 30.34
CE 8.70 9.65
BCI+CE 14.55 15.33
Compared to the benchmark scenario, the decline in aggregate output due to the
higher tax rates caused by bank capital injections is roughly equal to 5% for consump-
tion and 1% for labour income taxes. The increase in aggregate output, due to the
lower tax rates induced by credit easing is equal to 0.5% and 1%, when consumption
and labour income taxes are adopted, respectively. With distortionary taxes, the level
of aggregate output obtained under bank capital injections is roughly 20% higher than
the level obtained under credit easing. Under the benchmark scenario, this increase is
equal to 26% with consumption and 23% with labour income taxes. Hence, our ndings
point out the importance of using alternative scal policy instruments, when examining
and comparing the net benets of di¤erent unconventional policies.
4.3.3 Credit Policies and Welfare
Finally, we present a welfare analysis of alternative credit policies. As explained in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), it is now common to calculate the welfare using a
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second order approximation to the utility function in New Keynesian DSGE models.
We follow their methodology in our welfare calculations. First, we write the households
utility function recursively,
Vt = Ut(Ct; Ct 1;Lt) + EtVt+1 (4.40)
We then take a second order approximation of Vt around the steady state and a
second order approximation of the whole model. Using the second order solution, we
compute the value of Vt, which gives the welfare loss under the set out policy alterna-
tives. While calculating the welfare losses, we use the values of the policy parameters
(; y; ; and ') that optimize Vt in response to the capital quality shock. By taking
the di¤erence of the values of Vt obtained under the monetary policy rule only and
each credit policy alternative, we can nd the welfare gains from using each alterna-
tive. Then computing the fraction of the steady state consumption required to equate
welfare under the monetary policy rule, to the one under each credit policy alternative
gives the consumption equivalent (CE) for that policy. We present the CE obtained
under each credit policy alternative for two scenarios: lump-sum taxation (benchmark
scenario) and distortionary taxation. In Table 4.3, we use consumption taxes, while
in Table 4.4 we employ labour income taxes to compare with the benchmark scenario.
The second column in each table corresponds to the scenario where the scal authority
adopts distortionary taxes and uses government spending to respond to the changes in
the government budget constraint. The third column displays the scenario where the
tax rates are used to accommodate the changes in the scal balance. In each table, we
assume that the steady-state level of lump-sum taxes is equal to the steady-state tax
revenues obtained with the use consumption or labour income taxes.
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Table 4.3. Welfare Gains under Di¤erent Policy Rules - Consumption Taxes
CE (%)
Lump-sum T. Cons. T. & Variable Gt Cons. T. & Variable tct
BCI 0.0101 0.0102 0.0091
CE 0.0037 0.0036 0.0023
BCI+CE 0.0101 0.0101 0.0091
Table 4.4. Welfare Gains under Di¤erent Policy Rules - Labour Income Taxes
CE (%)
Lump-sum T. Lab. Inc. T. & Variable Gt Lab. Inc. T. & Variable tht
BCI 0.0115 0.0117 0.0089
CE 0.0050 0.0046 0.0033
BCI+CE 0.0115 0.0117 0.0089
We rst observe that the use of bank capital injections generates higher welfare gains
than the use of credit easing, under all scenarios. When both credit policies are in place,
the optimal coe¢ cient of the policy rule used for determining the quantity of credit
easing equals zero. Hence, the funds obtained by the issuance of government bonds are
fully allocated to bank capital injections. We then compare the welfare gains obtained
under di¤erent scenarios to the ones obtained under lump-sum taxation. Looking at
Table 4.3 column 2, we see that when the consumption tax rate remains constant, the
existence of distortionary taxes does not cause a change in the welfare gains. When
labour income taxes are in place and the tax rate does not change (Table 4.4 Column
2), welfare gains also remain roughly the same under both policies. Finally, looking at
the 3rd columns in both tables, we see that the use of tax rates to accommodate the
changes in the scal balance causes a decrease in the welfare gains obtained under both
unconventional policies. Use of a variable consumption tax rate is preferred to a variable
labour income tax rate when the government injects equity into banks. However, the
opposite holds when the central bank pursues credit easing.
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To summarize, four main points emerge from our welfare results: (i) bank capital
injections are more e¤ective in mitigating the negative e¤ects of nancial shocks to the
economy, as they stabilize credit spreads more, (ii) existence of lump-sum taxes, in place
of variable tax rates over-estimates the gains from pursuing credit market interventions,
(iii) in the presence of distortionary taxes, use of government spending, rather than tax
rates, to respond to the changes in the governments budget are preferred and nally
(iv) under distortionary taxation, the benets from using credit policies still outweigh
their costs.
4.3.4 Robustness Checks
When reporting the welfare gains obtained under the two credit policies, we use the
baseline calibration that has been presented in Section 4.3.1. To check the robustness
of our results, we re-calculate the welfare gains obtained under bank capital injections
and credit easing, changing the values of ve key parameters: the e¢ ciency costs of
government intermediation ( S = tN ), bank leverage at the steady state (), habit
persistence (), degree of price stickiness () and the steady state values for the tax
rates (tc and th). In each gure, we plot the CE(%) obtained with di¤erent values of a
given parameter. The gure consists of two graphs. The values of the CE in the rst
plot are obtained for labour income taxes, while the values in the second are obtained
for consumption taxes. In each plot, CEs are given under bank capital injections (BCI)
and credit easing (CE), with lump-sum taxes (T) or variable tax rates (t).
Figure 4.6 presents the results for the given alternatives, using a range of values
for the e¢ ciency costs. As e¢ ciency costs of credit policies increase, welfare gains
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from using them decrease, as expected. Our ndings are robust to the changes in
the e¢ ciency costs. In general, bank capital injections with lump-sum or distortionary
taxes, generate higher welfare gains than credit easing. In addition, use of distortionary
taxes decreases the gains from the use both credit policies, compared to lump-sum taxes.
When e¢ ciency costs are quite high at the level of 100 basis points, use of credit policies
still result in welfare gains, but the gains are quantitatively small.
Figure 4.6. Welfare Gains for Di¤erent Values of S = tN
In Figure 4.7, we demonstrate the welfare gains obtained with di¤erent values of
the steady state bank leverage, under the given scenarios. An increase in the steady
state bank leverage corresponds to a decrease in the steady state fraction of bank assets
that can be diverted. A decline in the fraction of assets relaxes the banks constraint
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and enables the bank to accumulate a higher level of leverage. As the leverage ratio
increases, negative e¤ects of the shocks to the economy are amplied more. Hence, use
of credit policies results in higher benets, as shown in the gure. When labour income
taxes are in place, the results that we have obtained in our welfare calculations hold for
most values: bank capital injections generate higher welfare gains than credit easing
under both lump-sum and distortionary taxes. In addition, introduction of distortionary
taxation, reduces the welfare gains from the use of both policies. On the other hand,
when distortionary consumption taxes are used, bank capital injections generate lower
welfare gains than credit easing, for sum values of .
Figure 4.7. Welfare Gains for Di¤erent Values of 
Figure 4.8 displays the welfare gains for di¤erent values of habit persistence. As
habit persistence increases, consumption smoothing improves welfare more. Since the
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use of the credit policies considered in our study decreases the volatility of consump-
tion, their contributions to the increase in welfare are higher for higher values of the
habit persistence parameter. Our results are robust to the changes in the habit para-
meter. Bank capital injections result in higher welfare gains and the introduction of
distortionary taxes reduces welfare, for all the values considered.
Figure 4.8. Welfare Gains for Di¤erent Values of 
In Figure 4.9, we present the welfare gains for di¤erent values of the probability that
rms will keep prices constant. We see that regardless of the value of , bank capital
injections generate higher welfare gains than credit easing, under both lump-sum and
distortionary taxes. However, with distortionary consumption taxes, the di¤erence
between the welfare gains of the two policies is quite small, for relatively low values of
the price rigidity parameter.
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Figure 4.9. Welfare Gains for Di¤erent Values of 
Finally, Figure 4.10 presents the welfare gains obtained for di¤erent values of the
steady state consumption or labour income tax rate. Since we assume that the steady-
state level of lump-sum taxes is equal to the steady-state tax revenues obtained with
the use consumption or labour income taxes, we adjust the steady state lump-sum tax
level according to each value of the tax rate considered. When lump-sum taxes are
in place, our results are robust to di¤erent steady state tax levels. With distortionary
consumption taxes, whether the use of credit easing results in lower welfare gains than
the use of bank capital injections, is dependant on the steady state tax rate.
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Figure 4.10. Welfare Gains for Di¤erent Values of tc or th
Examining the results of our robustness checks, we can conclude that when labour
income taxes are in place, our results are robust to di¤erent parameter specications
with both lump-sum and distortionary taxes. In general, bank capital injections induce
higher welfare gains than credit easing, and introduction of the distortionary labour
income tax rate decreases the welfare gains of both unconventional policies. However,
in the presence of the distortionary consumption tax rate, the unconventional policy
that generates the higher welfare gains varies with di¤erent values of the steady state
leverage ratio and the steady state tax rate.
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4.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of unconventional monetary and
scal policies; namely credit easing and bank capital injections. We conduct our analysis
utilizing a New Keynesian DSGE model that contains a banking sector with nancial
frictions and a scal authority which can obtain revenues with the use of alternative
scal policy instruments.
Our simulation results indicate that when the economy experiences a nancial shock,
the use of both credit policies mitigates the negative e¤ects of the given shock to the
economy. The shock causes a decrease in asset prices, which triggers the nancial
accelerator mechanism. Since banks are leveraged, the decline in asset prices results in
an amplied decline in their net worth, which increases their leverage ratios. The rise
in the leverage ratios increases the credit spread, which in turn, results in an increase
in the cost of capital and a further decline in investment and asset prices. Finally, the
decrease in investment leads to a decline in aggregate output. When credit easing or
bank capital injections are employed, the rise in the spread is lower. Consequently, the
negative e¤ects of the nancial shock on assets prices, investment and output are lower.
Compared to credit easing, use of bank capital injections has a higher positive e¤ect
on aggregate output, since it results in a direct increase in banksnet worth, which,
signicantly lowers the increase in the spread. However, use of equity injections causes
an increase in the expenditures of the government, as opposed to an increase in the
government revenues obtained with credit easing. Hence, when the government injects
capital into banks, taxes increase or government spending decreases.
Our quantitative results include the computation of welfare losses and consumption
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equivalents under each policy alternative, using welfare-maximizing monetary and credit
policy rules. Our rst nding is that the utilization of both unconventional policies
generates welfare gains. Use of lump-sum taxes, in place of distortionary taxes over-
estimates the gains from pursuing credit market interventions, only if the tax rate
is used to accommodate the changes in the scal balance. However, in the presence
of distortionary taxes, use of government spending to adjust to the changes in the
government budget constraint roughly results in the same welfare gains. Our second
nding is that when bank capital injections are used by the government, welfare gains
are higher compared to the use of credit easing by the central bank. This result holds
under both lump-sum taxes and variable tax rates.
Before we conclude, it should be mentioned that our results rely on the assumption
that the government does not default on its debt. If government bonds become subject
to default risk, the government would have limited ability to conduct unconventional
policy and this would, in turn, a¤ect the valuation of government bonds. We believe
that analyzing these issues should be a subject of further research.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis contributes to a variety of debates on optimal policy, using alternative New
Keynesian DSGE frameworks. The research questions that we aim to answer are as
follows: (i) are there di¤erences among optimal monetary policies in open and closed
economies?, (ii) are macroprudential policy tools e¤ective in ensuring the stability of
the nancial system?, (iii) is there a leading macroprudential policy tool for addressing
a certain nancial market externality?, (iv) are unconventional policy measures e¤ec-
tive in mitigating the negative e¤ects of nancial crises and nally (v) what are the
di¤erences between the scal implications of alternative unconventional policies?
We aim to answer question (i) in Chapter 2. In our analysis, we utilize the small open
economy framework developed by Gali and Monacelli (2005) and generalize their special
setting, where the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (), the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods (), and the elasticity of substitution between foreign
goods from di¤erent origins () are assumed to be equal to 1. We nd that using
a generalized parameterization has several important implications. Under the general
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setting, welfare losses in the open economy depend on the variance of the terms of trade,
in addition to the variance of consumption and ination. Consequently, monetary
policy for the open economy is not isomorphic to the one for the closed economy.
As the uctuations in the terms of trade are also important in the open economy, it
is plausible to add domestic ination and terms of trade based Taylor rules to the
comparison of alternative monetary policies. Increasing the value of ,  or  by
one unit and computing the welfare losses obtained under a number of simple policy
rules, we observe that the relative importance of the variation in the terms of trade
increases, while that of domestic ination decreases, with an increase in the values of
the aforementioned parameters. As a result, the domestic ination and the terms of
trade based Taylor rule turns out to be the preferred policy rule in the small open
economy. Exploring the change in the welfare losses obtained with an increase in the
value of each parameter, we see that this policy rule becomes the preferred rule with a
slight and a moderate increase in  and , respectively. The same result holds with a
signicant increase in . Hence, our results indicate that in open economies with high
elasticities of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and among di¤erent
foreign goods, monetary authorities should react to the movements in both domestic
ination and the terms of trade.
Next, in Chapter 3, we answer questions (ii) and (iii) by utilizing a Gertler and
Karadi (2011) type DSGE model with nancial frictions. Using this framework, we
present a comparative analysis of three macroprudential policy tools, which are reserve
requirements, capital requirements and a regulation premium. In our model, the nan-
cial accelerator mechanism built in banksborrowing constraints contains a pecuniary
externality, where bankers do not internalize the benets of equity nancing and ac-
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cumulate high levels of leverage. As a result, the negative e¤ects of exogenous shocks
to the economy are magnied through the following process: when a shock results in
a decline in asset prices, banksnet worth decrease in an amplied manner due to the
high leverage ratio. This corresponds to a downturn in banksbalance sheets, which
increases their leverage ratios and pushes up the spread. The increase in the spread,
in turn, increases the cost of capital and causes a further decrease in investment and
asset prices. Finally, the decrease in investment lowers aggregate output. All of the
aforementioned macroprudential tools are e¤ective in mitigating the negative e¤ects of
exogenous shocks to the economy and capital requirements perform the best in lowering
the negative e¤ects of the nancial accelerator mechanism built in banksborrowing
constraints. This result is due to their superior performance in lowering the negative
e¤ects of the given shocks to the spread, asset prices and investment. Comparing the
welfare implications of the macroprudential tools used in our study, we also nd that
the use of capital requirements generates the highest welfare gains, irrespective of the
source of the decline in economic activity. Since the nancial accelerator mechanism in
our framework works through the banking sectors high level of leverage and capital re-
quirements directly target the capital (inverse of the leverage) ratio of banks, we believe
that our ndings are not counter-intuitive. In addition, they indicate the importance
of determining the externalities in the nancial markets and using the most e¤ective
macroprudential tool in addressing each externality.
Finally, we aim to answer questions (iv) and (v) in Chapter 4. To do so, we present a
detailed evaluation of unconventional monetary and scal policies; namely credit easing
and bank capital injections. We conduct our analysis by adding a scal authority,
which can obtain revenues with the use of alternative scal policy instruments, to the
141
framework that we develop in the previous chapter. As explained in Chapter 3, when
an exogenous shock a¤ects the model economy and brings about a decrease in asset
prices, the nancial accelerator mechanism is triggered. As a result, the credit spread
and the cost of capital increases, due to the banking sectors high level of leverage.
Consequently, asset prices, investment and aggregate output decrease. The use of credit
easing or bank capital injections lowers the rise in the spread and hence, mitigates
the negative e¤ects of exogenous shocks to the economy. Utilization of bank capital
injections lowers the decrease in aggregate output more, as it results in a direct increase
in banksnet worth, which induces a signicant decline in the increase in the spread.
On the other hand, use of equity injections causes a rise in government expenditures, in
contrast to the increase in government revenues, when credit easing is used. As a result,
when the government injects equity into banks, taxes should increase or government
spending needs to decrease. Since the costs and the benets of bank capital injections
are both higher than that of credit easing, it is important to compute the welfare
losses obtained under each policy alternative. Our welfare results indicate the following
ndings: (i) the use of both type of unconventional policies generates welfare gains,
(ii) the presence of lump-sum taxes, in place of distortionary taxes over-estimates the
gains from pursuing unconventional policies, only if the tax rate is used to adjust to the
changes in governments budget. On the contrary, when distortionary taxes exist, use of
government spending to respond to the changes in the scal balance roughly induces the
welfare gains obtained under lump-sum taxes. Finally (iii) when bank capital injections
are used, welfare gains are higher compared to the use of credit easing, under both
lump-sum taxes and variable tax rates. Consequently, we anticipate that our results
indicate a higher relative importance of distortions in nancial markets, compared to
the distortions caused by variable tax rates.
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As we have previously mentioned, the literature on the e¤ectiveness of macropru-
dential and unconventional policy tools is growing rapidly. However, most of the papers
in the literature feature a closed economy model and hence, neglect an important di-
mension related to macroprudential policies: the regulatory arbitrage that arises when
the use of macroprudential tools is not coordinated across borders. Coordination of
regulatory standards would prevent a regulatory race-to-the-bottom, where countries
free-ride on the soundness of foreign banking systems (Bengui, 2014). Aiyar et al (2014)
show that the regulatory leakagecan be substantial. According to their study, UK-
owned banks decrease lending in response to higher capital requirements but this e¤ect
is partially o¤set by an increase in lending from resident foreign branches. The increase
in lending is about one-third of the initial response to the regulatory change. National
policies that ignore these transmission channels and do not internalize the international
e¤ects may result in an insu¢ cient degree of stabilization in the face of adverse nan-
cial shocks. For this reason, we believe that combining the frameworks that we used in
the second and the third chapter, to build a two-country DSGE model that contains
nancial frictions as described in Gertler and Karadi (2011), would be quite interest-
ing. Utilizing this framework, we can analyze the implications of introducing domestic
macroprudential policies in open economies and examine the consequences of regulatory
arbitrage that arises when the use of macroprudential tools is not coordinated across
borders. We aim to address these issues in further research.
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APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF THE WELFARE LOSS FUNCTION
UNDER THE GENERAL CASE
The second order Taylor expansion of Ut around the steady state (C, N) gives
Ut   U ' UcC

Ct   C
C

+ UnN

Nt  N
N

+
1
2
UccC
2

Ct   C
C
2
+
1
2
UnnN
2

Nt  N
N
2
(A.1)
where Ut  U (Ct; Nt) and U  U(C;N):
First, using the following second-order approximation of log deviations,
Kt  K
K
' k^t + 1
2
k^2t (A.2)
where k^t  kt   k is the log deviation from the steady state for a generic variable
kt; gives
Ut   U ' UcC

c^t +
1  
2
c^2t

+ UnN

n^t +
1 + '
2
n^2t

Here,    Ucc
Uc
C and '  Unn
Un
N:
Second, using the fact that Nt =

Yt
At
 R 1
0

PH;t(i)
PH;t
 
di to obtain
n^t = y^t   at + zt
with zt = log
R 1
0

PH;t(i)
PH;t
 
di, and combining the following expression with yt =
ct +
!

st, yields the relationship between (the log deviation of) labour, consumption
and the terms of trade,
n^t = c^t +
!

s^t   at + zt (A.3)
144
Lemma 1 zt = 2vari fpH;t(i)g+ o(k a k3): Proof: Gali and Monacelli, 2005.
As a result, the period utility t can be rewritten as
Ut   U = UcC

c^t +
1  
2
c^2t

+ UnN

c^t +
!

s^t +

2
vari fpH;t(i)g

+UnN

1 + '
2

c^t +
!

s^t
2
+ t:i:p: (A.4)
where t:i:p: stands for terms independent of policy.
Using the optimality condition for the social planner,  UN
UC
= 1 
1 +!
C
N
, the expression
above can be written as,
Ut   U
UcC
= c^t +
1  
2
c^2t  
1  
1   + !

c^t +
!

s^t +

2
vari fpH;t(i)g

  1  
1   + !

1 + '
2

c^2t +
!

2
s^2t + 2
!

c^ts^t

+ t:i:p:
=  1
2
[(1 + ')    (1  )] c^2t  
!

2 (1 + ')
2
s^2t  

2
vari fpH;t(i)g+
(1  )c^t   (1  )1  

s^t   (1  )(1  )(1 + ')

c^ts^t + t:i:p: (A.5)
where  = 1 
1 +! = 1  and  denotes the size of the steady state distortion.
Accordingly, the second-order approximation to welfare losses of the representative
consumer in the small open economy can be expressed as a fraction of steady state
consumption (and up to additive t.i.p.) as
W 0 =
1X
t=0
t

Ut   U
UcC

(A.6)
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Lemma 2
P1
t=0 
tvari fpH;t(i)g = 1

P1
t=0 
t2H;t: Proof: Woodford, 2003, Chapter 6.
Merging Lemma 2 with the expression for the welfare losses above, it can be seen
that,
W 0 =  1
2
[(1 + ')    (1  )]
1X
t=0
tc^2t  
!

2 (1 + ')
2
1X
t=0
ts^2t  

2
1X
t=0
t2H;t
+(1  )
" 1X
t=0
tc^t   (1  )

1X
t=0
ts^t   (1  )(1 + ')

1X
t=0
tc^ts^t
#
The following expression for the welfare losses can be rewritten using the distortion
in the steady state,  as follows,
W 0 =  1
2
[(1 + ')    (1  )]
1X
t=0
tc^2t  
!

2 (1 + ')
2
1X
t=0
ts^2t  

2
1X
t=0
t2H;t
+
" 1X
t=0
tc^t   (1  )

1X
t=0
ts^t   (1  )(1 + ')

1X
t=0
tc^ts^t
#
(A.7)
Finally, taking unconditional expectations on W 0, letting  ! 1 and using the case
of small distortions in the steady state, which eliminates the linear terms in W 0 and
gives the central banks problem the convenient quadratic format (Gali 2008, Chapter
5), the expected welfare losses under a generic case can be approximated by
L0 ~=  1
2
[(1 + ')    (1  )] var(ct) 
!

2 (1 + ')
2
var(st)  
2
var(H;t) (A.8)
(A.8) corresponds to equation (2.36) in the main text.
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APPENDIX B.1 THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
A competitive equilibrium of the model economy is dened by sequences of allo-
cations, prices, shock processes and the government policy (without the use of any
macroprudential tools) that satisfy the following optimality and market clearing condi-
tions,
Consumption Euler Equation UC;t= Rt+1Et [UC;t+1]
Labour Supply
Uh;t
UC;t
=  W t
Wholesale Output Y Wt = (Atht)
K1 t 1
Labour Demand P
W
t
Pt
Y Wh;t= W t
Return to Capital Rk;t+1=
(1 )P
W
t+1Y
W
t+1
Pt+1Kt
+(1 )Qt+1
Qt
Capital Accumulation Kt= [(1  )Kt 1 + (1  S (Xt)) It]
Investment & Asset Prices Qt (1  S (Xt) XtS 0 (Xt))
+Et

t;t+1Qt+1S
0 (Xt+1)X2t+1

= 1
Price Dispersion in the Retail Sector t =
R 1
0

Pt(f)
Pt
 
df
Retail Output1 Yt =
(1 c)YWt
t
Optimal Relative Price
P at
Pt
=
Ft
Ht
Price Dispersion & Ination t= 

tt 1+ (1  )

Ft
Ht
 
Non-linear Phillips Curve2 Ht Et
h
 1t+1Ht+1
i
= Y tUC;t
Ft   Et
h
t+1Ft+1
i
= YtUC;tMCt
 1t + (1  )

Ft
Ht
1 
= 1
Fisher Equation Rn;t 1= RtEtt
Taylor Rule log

Rn;t
Rn

=  log
 
t


+y log
 
Yt
Y

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Government Budget Constraint Gt= T t
Output Equilibrium Yt= Ct+I t+Gt
Loans to Non-nancial Firms & Capital St= Kt
Deposits Held at Banks Dt= QtSt N t
Accumulation of Bank Net Worth Nt= Rk;t ( + ")Qt 1St 1 RtDt 1
Marginal Value of Deposits vd;t= Ett;t+1t+1Rt+1
Excess Marginal Value of Loans s;t= Ett;t+1t+1 (Rk;t+1  Rt+1)
Leverage Ratio t=
vd;t
  s;t
Banking Sector Balance Sheet QtSt= tNt
The Spread spread = Rk;t Rt
1c = cost of converting wholesale output to retail output.
2 = steady state mark-up.
APPENDIX B.2 DATA SOURCES
This appendix presents the details of the data sources used to construct Table 3.2 in
the main text. All the time series of the nominal macroeconomic and nancial variables
are deated using the GDP deator.
 GDP Deator: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), NIPA Table 1.1.9. Implicit
Price Deators for Gross Domestic Product.
 Consumption: BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.5. Personal Consumption Expenditures.
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 Investment: BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.5. Gross Private Domestic Investment.
 Government Spending: BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.5. Government Consumption Ex-
penditures.
 Gross Domestic Product: BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.5. Sum of Consumption, Invest-
ment and Government Spending.
 Hours: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics Survey. Mul-
tiplication of Average Weekly Hours in Private Sector and Average Number of
Workers in Private Sector.
 Bank Assets: Federal Reserve Board (FRB), Data Download Program of Statisti-
cal & Historical Database. Bank Credit at the Asset Side of the U.S. Commercial
BanksBalance Sheet.
 Deposits: FRB, Data Download Program of Statistical & Historical Database.
Deposits Held at the U.S. Commercial Banks.
 Bank Net Worth: FRB, Data Download Program of Statistical & Historical Data-
base. Bank Credit minus Deposits.
 Leverage Ratio: FRB, Data Download Program of Statistical & Historical Data-
base. Ratio of Bank Credit to Net Worth.
 Spread: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Moodys Seasoned BAA Corporate
Bond Yield minus E¤ective Federal Funds Rate.
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APPENDIX C.1 HOUSEHOLDS OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM WITH
LUMP-SUM TAXES
A representative household maximizes expected discounted utility,
E0
1X
t=0
tUt(Ct; Ct 1;Lt) (C.1.1)
subject to her budget constraint,
Ct = Wtht + t +RtDt 1  Dt   Tt (C.1.2)
Here, 0<<1 is the subjective discount factor, E is the expectation operator, Ct
denotes consumption and Lt leisure, Wt the wage rate, ht(= 1  Lt) hours worked and
Dt bank deposits. t are the prots earned from the ownership of banks and rms and
Tt denotes lump-sum taxes/transfers.
The solution to the maximization problem is given by,
1 = Rt+1Et [t;t+1] (C.1.3)
Uh;t
UC;t
=  UL;t
UC;t
=  Wt (C.1.4)
where t;t+1 = 
UC;t+1
UC;t
is the real stochastic discount factor over the interval
[t; t+ 1].
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APPENDIX C.2 OPTIMAL INVESTMENT WITH INVESTMENT
COSTS
Capital producing rms maximize their expected discounted prots with respect to
It,
Et
1X
k=0
t;t+k [Qt+k (1  S (It+k=It+k 1)) It+k   It+k] (C.2.1)
where t;t+k = 
kC;t+k
C;t
is the real stochastic discount factor over the interval
[t; t+ k]. The rst two terms in (C.2.1) are given by
Et [t;t [Qt (1  S (It=It 1)) It   It] + t;t+1 [Qt+1 (1  S (It+1=It)) It+1   It+1]]
Since t;t = 1, the rst order condition with respect to It is obtained as
Et[Qt (1  S (It=It 1))  1 QtS 0 (It=It 1) It
It 1
 t;t+1Qt+1S 0 (It+1=It)

 It+1
I2t
It+1

] (C.2.2)
Inserting Xt  It=It 1 gives the rst order condition in the main text,
Qt (1  S (Xt) XtS 0 (Xt)) + Et

t;t+1Qt+1S
0 (Xt+1)X2t+1

= 1 (C.3.3)
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APPENDIX C.3 DYNAMICS OF PRICE DISPERSION
Since the demand equations forming aggregate investment and government expen-
ditures have the same functional form as aggregate consumption,
It(f) =

Pt(f)
Pt
 
It;Gt(f) =

Pt(f)
Pt
 
Gt (C.3.1)
the equilibrium for good f is given by
Yt(f) = (1  c)Atht(f)

Kt 1(f)
Y Wt (f)
 1 

= (Ct + It +Gt)

Pt(f)
Pt
 
(C.3.2)
where Y Wt (f); ht(f); Kt 1(f) are the quantities of output, hours and capital used in
the wholesale sector for the production of good f in the retail sector. Using the facts
that ht =
R 1
0
ht(f)df and the capital-labour ratio stays constant while integrating over
f , we have
Yt =
(1  c)Y Wt
t
(C.3.3)
as in the main text, where t =
R 1
0

Pt(f)
Pt
 
df is the measure of price dispersion.
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